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ABSTRACT
The study of the bias of new technologies is important both as part of the analysis of the nature of
technology adoption and the direction of technological change, and to understand the distributional
implications of new technologies. In this paper, I analyze the equilibrium bias of technology. I
distinguish between the relative bias of technology, which concerns how the marginal product of a
factor changes relative to that of another following the introduction of new technology, and the
absolute bias, which looks only at the effect of new technology on the marginal product of a factor.
The first part of the paper generalizes a number of existing results in the literature regarding the
relative bias of technology. In particular, I show that when the menu of technological possibilities
only allows for factor-augmenting technologies, the increase in the supply of a factor always induces
technological change (or technology adoption) relatively biased towards that factor. This force can
be strong enough to make the relative marginal product of a factor increasing in response to an
increase in its supply, thus leading to an upward-sloping relative demand curve. However, I also
show that the results about relative bias do not generalize when more general menus of technological
possibilities are considered. In the second part of the paper, I show that there are much more general
results about absolute bias. I prove that under fairly mild assumptions, an increase in the supply of
a factor always induces changes in technology that are absolutely biased towards that factor, and
these results hold both for small changes and large changes in supplies. Most importantly, I also
determine the conditions under which the induced-technology response will be strong enough so that
the price (marginal product) of a factor increases in response to an increase in its supply. These
conditions correspond to a form of failure of joint concavity of the aggregate production function
of the economy in factors and technology. This type of failure of joint concavity is quite possible in







daron@mit.edu1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Despite the generally-agreed importance of technological progress for economic growth and a
large and inﬂuential literature on technological progress,1 the determinants of the direction
and bias of technological change are not well understood. An analysis of the direction and
bias of technical change is important for a number of reasons. First, in most situations, tech-
nical change is not neutral: it beneﬁts some factors of production, while directly or indirectly
reducing the compensation of others. This possibility is illustrated both by the distributional
impact of the major technologies introduced during the Industrial Revolution and the eﬀects
of technological change on the structure of wages during the past half century or so.2 The bias
of technological change determines its distributional implications (i.e., which groups are the
winners and which will be the losers from technological progress) and thus the willingness of
diﬀerent groups to embrace new technologies. Second, an understanding of the determinants
of innovation requires an analysis of the bias and direction of new technologies, for example,
for evaluating whether lines of previous innovations or technologies will be exploited in the
future and the potential compatibility between old and new technologies.3 Finally, the bias
of technology is important for understanding the macroeconomic implications of technological
progress.
These and related questions have spurred a relatively large literature investigating various
dimensions of the bias of technology. The pioneering study was Hicks’ seminal book, The
Theory of Wages (1932), which ﬁrst discussed the issue of induced innovation.4 The topic
later attracted attention from the leading economists of the 1960s, notably Kennedy (1964),
Samuelson (1965), Drandakis and Phelps (1965), Ahmad (1966), Nordhaus (1973), David
(1975), and Binswanger and Ruttan (1978), who studied the link between factor prices and
technical change. The focus of this literature was on the macroeconomic consequences of
induced innovation and was shaped by a critical passage in Hicks’s book where he argued:
1See, among others, Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980), Reinganum (1981, 1985), Spence (1984), and Grossman
and Shapiro (1987) in the industrial organization literature and Romer (1990), Segerstrom, Anant and Dinopou-
los (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991), Aghion and Howitt (1992), Stokey (1991, 1995), and Young (1993)
in the economic growth literature.
2On the biases and distributional eﬀects of the technologies introduced during the Industrial Revolution, see
Mantoux (1961) or Mokyr (1990), and on recent developments, see footnote 6 below.
3See, for example, Farrell and Saloner (1985) and Katz and Shapiro (1985).
4There is an implicit reference to this issue in Marx, when he discusses how labor scarcity–the exhaustion
of the reserve army of labor–may induce the capitalist to substitute machinery for labor (see Rosenberg, 1982),
and also in Habakkuk’s (1962) well-known contrast of faster technological progress in the United States than in
Britain because of labor scarcity in the former country (see, in particular, p. 44).
1“A change in the relative prices of the factors of production is itself a spur to
invention, and to invention of a particular kind–directed to economizing the use
of a factor which has become relatively expensive.” (pp. 124-5)
Although not explicitly stated, the implicit message in this sentence (and the way it was
interpreted) was that factor prices were the crucial element shaping the bias and direction
of technological progress (or technological adoption), and somehow as a factor becomes more
abundant, thus less expensive, technical change should become less biased towards that factor.5
The topic of biased technological change received renewed interest over the past decade, as
a result of a number of macro phenomena, particularly, the evidence that overall technological
change over the past 60 years has been biased towards skilled workers (e.g., Autor, Katz and
Krueger, 1998). This led a number of authors to formulate extensions of endogenous growth
models (Acemoglu, 1998, 2002, 2003a,b, Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 2000, Kiley, 1999, Caselli and
Coleman, 2004, Xu, 2001, Gancia, 2003, Thoenig and Verdier, 2003, Ragot, 2003, Duranton,
2004, Benabou, 2005, and Jones, 2005), whereby technical change could be directed to one of
multiple (typically two) sectors or factors.6
These models were descendents of the endogenous growth models of Romer, Grossman and
Helpman, and Aghion and Howitt. As a result, they incorporated a number of speciﬁc features.
These included a quasi-linear structure to obtain long-run growth, the constant elasticity of
demand borrowed from the Dixit-Stiglitz-Spence model, diﬀerent types of technologies that
were of factor-augmenting type, and the market size eﬀect, inherent in Romer’s original article
and present in the second generation of endogenous technical change models (see, e.g., Aghion
and Howitt, 1998).
5Nevertheless, parts of Hicks’s reasoning did not go uncriticized. For example, Salter (1966) and Samuelson
(1965) pointed out that ﬁrms should strive to economize on total costs not only on the factor that has become
relatively more expensive, thus questioning Hicks’s reasoning (see also Nordhaus, 1973). But the essential ideas
encapsulated in the quote remained inﬂuential in the literature. I will clarify below that this quote is never
correct for factor bias, but would be true for factor-augmenting changes as long as the relevant (local) elasticity
of substitution is less than one.
Another implication of this quote relates to the eﬀect of the price of a factor, say labor, on the overall amount
of technology adoption or innovation, which is also an interesting area for study, but not part of the focus of
this paper. See Acemoglu and Finkelstein (2005) for a theoretical and empirical investigation of this point.
6The focus of the ﬁrst papers in this literature, Acemoglu (1998) and Kiley (1999), was to investigate when
and why technology could be biased towards skilled workers. This was partly motivated by the evidence that
in the 19th and early 20th centuries, new technologies were often replacing skilled workers, which contrasted to
the later skill-biased nature of technological change (see James and Skinner, 1985, Goldin and Katz, 1995, on
the earlier era, and Goldin and Katz, 1998 or Autor, Katz and Krueger, 1998, on the more recent trends). Later
Acemoglu (2003b) and Jones (2005) used similar ideas to investigate whether there are any compelling reasons
for technical change to be purely labor augmenting as required for the existence of a balanced growth path in
standard growth models. Acemoglu (2003a), Xu (2001), Gancia (2003), and Thoenig and Verdier (2003) used
versions of this framework to investigate the eﬀect of international trade on the bias of technology.
2This structure led to some very sharp results about the relative equilibrium bias of technol-
ogy, which, in many ways, stood in contrast to the implicit message of Hicks’s quote mentioned
above. Using an endogenous growth model with two sectors and a constant elasticity of sub-
stitution between factors, Acemoglu (2002) showed that these models implied essentially the
opposite conclusion to that of Hicks’s quote. To describe these results, let relative bias, in a
two-factor world, be the impact of new technology on the marginal product of a factor relative
to that of the other.7 The main result in this class of models is that when a factor becomes
more abundant, technology becomes endogenously more (relatively) biased towards that factor.
The question that arises naturally is whether these results are an artifact of special as-
sumptions imposed in this class of models. Understanding the source of existing results is not
only important for deriving general theorems about equilibrium bias, but also because without
such an understanding, the forces determining the nature of technology adoption and techno-
logical progress remain unclear. The purpose of this paper is to provide an in-depth analysis
of equilibrium bias and provide general theorems in the most natural setting that allows an
analysis of these questions.
To motivate the analysis, we may return to the results from Acemoglu (2002) mentioned
above, and wonder whether those results hold in more general settings. In particular, we may
start with the following conjecture:
Conjecture (Relative Endogenous Bias): When the supply of a factor Z increases,
technology becomes relatively more biased towards factor Z.
The ﬁrst theorem in this paper shows that this conjecture is correct in a world with two
factors and two factor-augmenting technologies, thus generalizing existing results. Moreover,
it will provide precise conditions for this relative bias to be strong, i.e., for the increase in
the relative supply of a factor to increase its relative price once technology has adjusted to
the change in factor supplies. The second result, however, is that once we depart from an
environment in which all technologies are of the factor-augmenting kind, this conjecture is no
longer true. It is possible to construct relatively simple examples where it fails.
Despite this negative result, the main results in the paper, presented in the second part, are
a series of positive and fairly general results about equilibrium bias. In contrast to the focus
in Acemoglu (1998, 2002) and the conjecture above, these results concern the “absolute”, not
relative, bias. A technology is said to be absolutely biased towards a factor if it increases its
7Equivalently, bias can be described as referring to cost-minimizing relative factor demands at a given factor
price ratio. The two deﬁnitions of relative bias are equivalent for the purposes in this paper.
3marginal product.8 While understanding relative bias is essential for a certain class of questions
(for example, those concerning inequality), an analysis of absolute bias is equally important,
for example, for understanding the implications of technological change for the level of wages
or the level of rewards to other factors.
One of the main results of the paper is the following theorem which is stated loosely and
without the necessary assumptions here (which are explained subsequently):
Theorem (Weak Endogenous Bias): When the supply of a factor Z increases, tech-
nology becomes absolutely biased towards factor Z.
Stated diﬀerently, this theorem shows that under a set of relatively mild assumptions on
the underlying environment, there is a strong result about equilibrium bias; technology will
progressively favor factors that are becoming abundant. I will show that this theorem applies
under two alternative sets of suﬃcient conditions. The ﬁrst set of conditions requires the
measure (vector) of technology to belong to a convex subset of RK for some K ≥ 1, which will
lead to a local theorem (i.e., a result that applies in response to small changes in the supply of a
factor Z). The second possibility is a global theorem. The conditions necessary for this version
of the theorem can be best understood by using the tools of monotone comparative statics as
developed by Topkis (1978, 1979, 1998), Milgrom and Roberts (1990a,b, 1994), Vives (1990),
and Milgrom and Shannon (1994). In fact, the suﬃcient condition for the global theorem is
a form of supermodularity (or increasing diﬀerences) between factor Z (or a set of factors,
Z1,...,Z N) and a vector θ denoting technology choices.
These results are not only interesting because of their generality, but also because they shed
light on a variety of real-world phenomena. For example, they suggest why recent technical
change may have increased the demand for skilled workers (since there has been a signiﬁcant
increase in the number of more educated workers), and why technological progress may have
been biased towards unskilled workers in the past (since there was a large increase in the supply
of unskilled workers in British cities during the 19th century, see, for example, Habakkuk 1962,
or Williamson, 1990).
The above theorem is referred to as the “weak endogenous bias” theorem, because it only
speciﬁes the direction of the bias. Perhaps more important and certainly more surprising is
the following theorem:
Theorem (Strong Endogenous Bias): When the aggregate production possibilities set
of the economy is nonconvex, an increase in the supply of a factor Z induces technology to
8Thus the diﬀerence is that this marginal product is not compared to the marginal product of other factors.
4become suﬃciently biased towards factor Z so as to increase its equilibrium price.
In other words, when the production possibilities set is nonconvex, equilibrium bias will be
strong enough that endogenous-technology demand curves for factors will be upward-sloping
rather than downward-sloping as in the standard neoclassical theory. This result will be stated
in Theorem 8 below. Puts diﬀerently, there will be strong (absolute) equilibrium bias if and
only if the aggregate output of the economy (or a transformation of it) fails to be jointly
concave in technology (say θ)a n dZ (which is the essence of the nonconvexity mentioned
above). In equilibrium output (proﬁts) will be maximized in the choice of Z by ﬁrms, while
the choice of technology θ by some other agents (a technology monopolist or research ﬁrm) will
also maximize output (or some transform thereof). Nevertheless, these two conditions together
do not guarantee that the equilibrium, say (Z∗,θ∗), is a maximum of the aggregate output (or
its transform). Instead, (Z∗,θ∗) could be a saddle point, meaning that there exists a direction
in the (Z,θ) plane in which aggregate output increases. Essentially, Theorem 8 will show
that there will be strong equilibrium bias whenever this is the case, and strong bias will never
exist when (Z∗,θ∗) is in fact a maximum. This implies that the equilibrium structure, where
technology and factor demands are chosen by diﬀerent agents in the economy is essential for
this result, since otherwise, (Z∗,θ∗) would be a maximum, thus ruling out strong bias. Equally
important, however, is the observation that once we have an economy in which factor demands
and technology are chosen by diﬀerent agents, such strong bias is quite easy to obtain, because
there is nothing that rules out nonconvexities or guarantees that (Z∗,θ∗) should be a maximum
in all directions.
In addition to the earlier work on induced innovation literature and the recent directed
technical change literature that have already been discussed above, this paper is closely re-
lated to work on the LeChatelier principle. Recall that the LeChatelier principle concerns the
demand for factors of a proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrm, and states that long-run demand curves (which
allow adjustment in all factors) are more elastic than short-run demand curves (which hold
the employment level of other factors constant). In other words, in response to an increase in
the price of a factor, the employment of this factor declines more in the short-run than in the
long-run. This principle was ﬁrst stated and proved by Samuelson (1947) for small changes in
factor prices, but was known not to be true for large changes (see, for example, Samuelson,
1960, Roberts, 1999). It was later generalized by Milgrom and Roberts (1996) to a global
LeChatelier principle under the assumption that production functions are supermodular (see
also Silberberg, 1974). The intuition underlying the LeChatelier principle is that the ﬁrm can
5adjust other factors to increase the marginal product of the factor whose price has increased. At
some level, results about the endogenous bias of technology correspond to equilibrium versions
of the LeChatelier principle. The main diﬀerence is that the focus here is the eﬀect of changes
in factor supplies on equilibrium outcomes, rather than the partial equilibrium/optimization
focus of the LeChatelier principle. The above discussion illustrates that this equilibrium struc-
ture is responsible for the possibility of strong equilibrium bias (since a ﬁrm’s demand curve
for a factor can never be upward sloping, even in the long run, see, e.g., Mas-Colell, Whinston
and Green, 1995, Proposition 5.C.2). Equivalently, as discussed above, strong equilibrium bias
requires technology and factor demands to be chosen by diﬀerent agents.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I describe three alternative
environments, with diﬀerent market structures and assumptions on technology choice, and
show that the determination of equilibrium bias in these three diﬀerent economies boils down
t ot h es a m ep r o b l e m ,w i t ht h em aj o rd i ﬀerence that two of the economies allow for more natural
nonconvexities in the aggregate production possibilities set. Section 3 provides a generalization
of existing relative bias results, but also shows why the conjecture regarding relative bias above
is not correct unless we restrict the technology possibilities menu to only factor-augmenting
technologies. The main results of the paper are contained in Section 4 and 5. Section 4 presents
a number of versions of the theorems on weak equilibrium (absolute) bias and also clariﬁes the
limits of these theorems. Section 5 contains the results on strong equilibrium bias. Section 6
concludes, while Appendices A and B contain some additional technical material.
2T h e B a s i c E n v i r o n m e n t s
Consider a static economy consisting of a unique ﬁnal good and two sets of factors of produc-
tion, a total of N + M, Z =(Z1,...,Z N) and L =(L1,...,L M). Throughout, I assume that all
agents’ preferences are deﬁned over the consumption of the ﬁnal good. Moreover, all factors
are supplied inelastically and denote their supplies by ¯ Z ∈ RN
+ and ¯ L ∈ RM
+ . The reason for
distinguishing between these two sets of factors is to carry out comparative static exercises
varying the supply of factors Z, while holding the supply of other factors, L, constant. The
economy consists of a continuum of ﬁrms (ﬁnal good producers) denoted by the set F,e a c h
with an identical production function. Without loss of any generality let us normalize the
measure of F, |F|, to 1. The price of the ﬁnal good is also normalized to 1.9
9Since all agents’ preferences are deﬁned over the ﬁnal good, ownership of ﬁrms is not important for the
equilibrium allocations. In particular, ﬁrms will always maximize proﬁts independent of their exact ownership
6I will consider three diﬀerent environments to highlight the importance of convexity of
the aggregate production set. All three environments will lead to a similar structure for the
determination of equilibrium bias. In particular, they will all generate the weak equilibrium
bias under the set of conditions already discussed in the Introduction, but two of them can
generate the strong equilibrium bias more naturally (see below for formal deﬁnitions).
The ﬁrst, Economy D (for decentralized), is a completely decentralized economy in which
technologies are chosen by ﬁrms themselves. In some ways, in this economy, technology choice
can be interpreted as choice of just another set of factors. This economy also has some simi-
larity to the models recently analyzed by Boldrin and Levine (2001, 2004) and Quah (2003),
which emphasize the possibility of endogenous technological change without monopolistic com-
petition. But from the point of view of this paper, the most important aspect of Economy D
is that the whole discussion can be in terms of technology adoption, and we can work with a
convex decentralized economy familiar from basic general equilibrium analysis.
The second, Economy C (for centralized), features a benevolent social planner choosing
the technology. The third is, in many ways, the most standard environment, and features a
monopolist choosing and selling technologies. This environment, Economy M (for monopoly),
will lead to identical results to Economy C. A tradition dating back to Schumpeter (1934) and
Arrow (1962), and more recently used by Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991), and
Aghion and Howitt (1992), emphasizes both the non-rivalrous nature of new technologies and
the monopoly power necessary to recoup the investments made for R&D, and these features
are captured in Economy M in a simple manner.
2.1 Economy D–Decentralized Equilibrium
In the ﬁrst environment, Economy D, all markets are competitive and technology is decided
by each ﬁrm separately. In this case, each ﬁrm i ∈ F has access to a production function
Y i = F(Zi,Li,θi) (1)
where Zi ∈ Z ⊂RN
+,Li ∈ L ⊂RM
+ and θi ∈ Θ is the measure of technology. F is a real-valued
production function, which, for simplicity, I take to be twice continuously diﬀerentiable in
(Zi,Li).10 For now I impose no structure on the set Θ, but for concreteness, one might think
structure. For this reason, I do not specify the ownership structure of ﬁrms in what follows.











], this means that it is diﬀerentiable over
some open set containing Z×L[Z×L×Θ].
The diﬀerentiability assumptions are not necessary for the main results, and only facilitate the exposition
by allowing a clear deﬁnition of marginal products and factor prices. Without diﬀerentiability, factor prices
(marginal products) can take values in the set of generalized Clarke derivatives as deﬁned in Clarke (1990).
7of Θ ⊂ RK for some K ∈ N. For many instances of technology choice, Θ may consist of
discrete elements (corresponding to separate technologies), so it may not be a convex set. For
the global results, we will need that both Θ and Z are lattices according to some order.11












where wZj is the price of factor Zj for j =1 ,...,N,a n dwLj is the price of factor Lj for
j =1 ,...,M, all taken as given by the ﬁrm. Similar to the notation for L and Z,Iw i l lu s e
wZ and wL to denote the vector of factor prices. Since there is a total supply ¯ Zj of factor Zj








jdi ≤ ¯ Lj for j =1 ,...,M.( 3 )




and factor prices (wZ,wL) such that
©
Zi,Li,θiª
i∈F solve (2) given prices (wZ,wL) and (3)
holds.
I refer to any θi that is part of the set of equilibrium allocations,
©
Zi,Li,θiª
i∈F,a s“ e q u i -
librium technology”.
Assumption 1 Θ ⊂ RK for some K ≥ 1, F(Zi,Li,θi) is jointly strictly concave in (Zi,Li,θi)
and increasing in (Zi,Li),a n dZ, L and Θ are convex.
Then by standard arguments we have:
Lemma 1 (Symmetry) Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then in any competitive equilibrium,
(Zi,Li,θi)=( ¯ Z, ¯ L,θ) for all i ∈ F.
Proof. This lemma follows immediately by the strict concavity of F(Zi,Li,θi),w h i c h
implies strict concavity of π(Zi,Li,θi). To obtain a contradiction, suppose that two ﬁrms, i
and i0,c h o o s e(Zi,Li,θi) and (Zi0
,Li0
,θi0
), such that (Zi,Li,θi) 6=( Zi0
,Li0
,θi0
). This is only
11Since Z is a subset of R
N
+, an easy way to guarantee that it is a lattice is to assume it to be a “box-
constrained” region (or a cube) with a minimum and maximum value for each Z
i
j. Although the lattice structure
can be restrictive under some circumstances, for example when there are budget-type relationships between
subcomponents of the vector, it is not very restrictive in this context, since the fact that a ﬁrm is hiring more








) for some λ ∈ (0,1), which is feasible by the convexity of L, Z and Θ.S t r i c t
concavity implies that π(Z,L,θ) >λ π (Zi,Li,θi)+( 1− λ)π(Zi0
,Li0
,θi0




), delivering a contradiction. Therefore for all i ∈ F,w eh a v e
(Zi,Li,θi)=( Z,L,θ).S i n c e F is increasing in (Zi,Li), market clearing, (3), and |F| =1
imply that (Z,L)=( ¯ Z, ¯ L), completing the proof.
Assumption 1 may be restrictive, however, because it rules out constant returns to scale
in (Zi,Li,θi). Alternatively, we can modify this assumption to allow for constant returns to
scale:12
Assumption 1’ Θ ⊂ RK for some K ≥ 1, F(Zi,Li,θi) is increasing in (Zi,Li) and exhibits
constant returns to scale in (Zi,Li,θi), and we have (¯ Z, ¯ L) ∈ Z×L .
Proposition 1 (Welfare Theorem D) Suppose Assumption 1 or Assumption 1’ holds.
Then any equilibrium technology θ is a solution to
max
θ0∈Θ
F(¯ Z, ¯ L,θ0), (4)
and any solution to this problem is an equilibrium technology.
Proof. (=⇒) First suppose Assumption 1 holds. Suppose that
©
Zi,Li,θiª
i∈F is a com-
petitive equilibrium. By Lemma 1,
©
Zi,Li,θiª




¡¯ Z, ¯ L,θ
¢
for all
i ∈ F. Moreover, by the deﬁnition of a competitive equilibrium, there exist wZ and wL such
that













This implies that any equilibrium technology θ satisﬁes θ ∈ argmaxθ0∈Θ F(¯ Z, ¯ L,θ0). Next, sup-
pose that Assumption 1’ holds. In that case, without loss of any generality, we can consider
an equilibrium with only one (representative) ﬁrm active and employing (¯ Z, ¯ L) ∈ Z×L .C o n -
sequently, by the deﬁnition of a competitive equilibrium (5) holds. Thus the same conclusion
follows.
(⇐=) First suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Take θ ∈ argmaxθ0∈Θ F(¯ Z, ¯ L,θ0).B y t h e
strict concavity of F,t h eﬁrst-order conditions of (5) are necessary and suﬃcient. Consider the
12It is also possible to allow for mixtures of constant returns to scale and strict convexity, but this introduces
additional notation, and since it is not essential for the focus here, I simplify the analysis by using either
Assumption 1 or Assumption 1’.
9factor price vectors wZ and wL such that wZj = ∂F(¯ Z, ¯ L,θ)/∂Zj and wLj = ∂F(¯ Z, ¯ L,θ)/∂Lj.




¡¯ Z, ¯ L,θ
¢
for all
i ∈ F satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order conditions of (5), so it is a competitive equilibrium, thus θ is
an equilibrium technology. Next, suppose that Assumption 1’ holds. Once again, we can
consider an equilibrium with only one ﬁrm active employing (¯ Z, ¯ L) ∈ Z×L ,s oa n yθ ∈
argmaxθ0∈Θ F(¯ Z, ¯ L,θ0) is an equilibrium technology, completing the proof.
Proposition 1 is useful since it enables us to focus on a simple maximization problem
rather than an equilibrium problem. An important implication of this proposition is also
that the equilibrium corresponds to a maximum of F in the entire vector
¡
Zi,Li,θi¢
.I t i s
also straightforward to see that equilibrium factor prices in this economy are equal to the
marginal products of the F function, and are given by wZj = ∂F(¯ Z, ¯ L,θ)/∂Zj and wLj =
∂F(¯ Z, ¯ L,θ)/∂Lj where θ is the equilibrium technology choice.
We next derive a similar maximization problem for Economies C and M, which relax
the strong (joint) convexity assumptions inherent in Economy D, and show that a similar
equilibrium characterization can be obtained for these economies, but without the implication




2.2 Economy C–Centralized Equilibrium
In this economy, there is still a unique ﬁnal good and each ﬁrm has access to the production
function
Y i = G(Zi,Li,θi). (6)
In particular, we again have Zi ∈ Z ⊂RN
+,Li ∈ L ⊂RM
+ and θi ∈ Θ is the measure of technology,
and G is again a real-valued production function that is twice continuously diﬀerentiable in
(Zi,Li).
Each ﬁrm has free access to the technology θ provided by the centralized (socially-run)
research ﬁrm. This research ﬁrm can create any technology θ at cost C (θ) from the available
technology menu Θ. Once created, this technology is non-excludable and available to any
ﬁrm (as well as non-rival, see Arrow, 1962, Romer, 1990). In addition, to further simplify the
analysis, I assume that the research ﬁrm can only choose one technology, which might be, for
example, because of the necessity of standardization across ﬁrms.13
13In general, a social planner may want to create two diﬀerent technologies, say θ1 and θ2, and provide one
technology to a subset of ﬁrms and the other to the rest. This strategy may be optimal if C (θ) were suﬃciently
small (so that duplication costs are not too large).
In the environment outlined here, this option will not typically work because of non-excludability. In partic-
10All factor markets are again competitive. Consequently, given the technology oﬀer of θ of












Notice the important diﬀerence in this maximization problem relative to that in Economy
D: ﬁrms are only maximizing with respect to
¡
Zi,Li¢
, not with respect to θi,w h i c hw i l lb e
determined by the research ﬁrm.
T h eo b j e c t i v eo ft h er e s e a r c hﬁrm is to maximize total surplus, or total output. Since






G(Zi,Li,θ)di − C (θ). (8)
This leads to a natural deﬁnition of equilibrium:




choice θ and factor prices (wZ,wL) such that
©
Zi,Liª
i∈F solve (7) given (wZ,wL) and θ, (3)
holds, and the technology choice for the research ﬁrm, θ, maximizes (8).
We now impose weaker versions of Assumptions 1 and 1’ on G:
Assumption 2 G(Zi,Li,θi) is jointly strictly concave and increasing in (Zi,Li) and Z and
L are convex.
Assumption 2’ G(Zi,Li,θi) is increasing and exhibits constant returns to scale in (Zi,Li),
and we have (¯ Z, ¯ L) ∈ Z×L .
The important diﬀerence between Assumptions 1 and 1’ versus Assumptions 2 and 2’ is




, which will play
an important role in the results below (nor does Θ need to be a subset of RK).
ular, all ﬁrms would want to use the technology that is superior. Nevertheless, there can be some situations
in which the research ﬁrm may prefer to create two distinct technologies, θ1 and θ2,f r o mt h em e n u .F o rt h i s ,
it needs to be the case that ﬁrst, neither of the two technologies is superior to the other (i.e., which one leads
to higher output depends on factor proportions); second, F has to be jointly non-concave in θ and (Z,L),s o
that some ﬁrms may choose θ1 and the corresponding factor demand, while others choose θ2 and other levels
of factor demands, and all ﬁrms make the same level of proﬁts; and third, C (θ) should be low enough that the
costs of creating two diﬀerent technologies, θ1 and θ2, is not prohibitive. Such situations are relatively rare and
are not central to the focus here, so rather than deriving the conditions on C (θ) and the production function
G to rule out this possibility, I simply assume that choosing two separate technologies from the menu is not
possible.
11Proposition 2 (Equilibrium Theorem C) Suppose Assumption 2 or Assumption 2’ holds.
Then any equilibrium technology is a solution to
max
θ∈Θ
G(¯ Z, ¯ L,θ) − C (θ) (9)
and any solution to this problem is an equilibrium technology.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Proposition 1, and follows again by noting that
under Assumption 2, the equilibrium will be symmetric, so (Zi,Li,θ)=( Z,L,θ). In addition,
because G is increasing in (Zi,Li), market clearing, (3), yields that (Z,L)=( ¯ Z, ¯ L),w h i c h
implies that (8) is identical to (9). When Assumption 2’ holds, there are constant returns to
scale in (Z,L),a n d(¯ Z, ¯ L) ∈ Z×L , so we can once again work with a single ﬁrm employing
(¯ Z, ¯ L), and the conclusion follows.
Deﬁning F(¯ Z, ¯ L,θ)=G(¯ Z, ¯ L,θ) − C (θ), we obtain that technology choice in Economy
C can be characterized as maximizing some function F(¯ Z, ¯ L,θ) with respect to θ ∈ Θ as in
Economy D. However, I refer to this as an “equilibrium theorem” not as a welfare theorem as
for Proposition 1, since despite the fact that the objective of the research ﬁrm is to maximize
social surplus, the equilibrium may not be the social optimum. This results from the fact that
once created, technologies are non-excludable, so all ﬁrms use it, whereas the social planner
may have preferred to exclude some ﬁrms to enable remaining ﬁr m st oh i r em o r eo ft h ef a c t o r s
of production (recall footnote 13). The equilibrium structure, as captured by Deﬁnition 2,
does not allow for this possibility given the non-excludable nature of the technology.
For our purposes, the more important diﬀerence is that while in Economy D F(¯ Z, ¯ L,θ)
is by assumption jointly concave in (Z,θ), the same is not true in Economy C. In particular,
in this latter economy, F(¯ Z, ¯ L,θ) does not need to be concave in (Z,θ) (nor is it necessarily
globally concave in θ).
It is also useful to note that equilibrium factor prices are now given by wZj = ∂G(¯ Z, ¯ L,θ)/∂Zj
and wLj = ∂G(¯ Z, ¯ L,θ)/∂Lj, but since F(¯ Z, ¯ L,θ)=G(¯ Z, ¯ L,θ) − C (θ),t h i si se q u i v a l e n tt o
wZj = ∂F(¯ Z, ¯ L,θ)/∂Zj and wLj = ∂F(¯ Z, ¯ L,θ)/∂Lj as in Economy D.
2.3 Economy M–Monopoly Equilibrium
Now I brieﬂy discuss an economy that is similar to Economy C, but features a monopolist sup-
plying technologies to ﬁnal good producer ﬁrms. I take the simplest structure to deliver results
similar to Propositions 1 and 2, while Appendix A analyzes exactly the setup of Economy C
with a monopolist provider of technologies.
12In the environment here, there is still a unique ﬁnal good and each ﬁrm has access to the
production function








which is similar to (6), except that G(Zi,Li,θi) is now a subcomponent of the production
function, which depends on θi, the technology being used by the ﬁrm. This subcomponent




conditioned on θi to emphasize that it embodies technology θi. This intermediate good is
supplied by the monopolist. The term α−α (1 − α)
−1 in the front is a convenient normalization.
This structure is a generalization of the setup common in equilibrium models of endogenous
technology (e.g., Romer, 1990, Grossman and Helpman, 1991, or Aghion and Howitt, 1992,
1998). As before, I assume that Zi ∈ Z ⊂RN
+,Li ∈ L ⊂RM
+ and G is a real-valued production
function that is twice continuously diﬀerentiable in (Zi,Li).
The technology monopolist can create technology θ at cost C (θ) from the technology menu,
and again I assume that it can only choose one technology. Once created, the technology
monopolist can produce as many units of the intermediate good of type θ (that is, of the
intermediate goods embodying technology θ)a tp e ru n i tc o s tn o r m a l i z e dt o1 − α unit of the
ﬁnal good (this is also a convenient normalization, without any substantive implications). It
can then set a (linear) price per unit of the intermediate good of type θ,d e n o t e db yχ.
All factor markets are again competitive. Consequently, each ﬁrm takes the type of available




















which gives the following simple inverse demand for intermediates of type θ as a function of




The problem of the monopolist is to maximize its proﬁts (which are equal to price minus
marginal cost of production times total sales of the intermediates, minus the cost of creating
the technology). Thus the problem of the monopolist is:
max
θ,χ,[qi(θ,χ,Zi,Li)]i∈F





di − C (θ) (13)
13subject to (12). Therefore, an equilibrium in this economy can be deﬁned as:










(11) given (wZ,wL,χ) and technology θ, (3) holds, and the technology choice and pricing
decision for the monopolist, (θ,χ), maximize (13) subject to (12).
Once again the important distinction between this deﬁnition and Deﬁnition 1 is that now
factor demands and technology are being decided by diﬀerent agents (the former by the ﬁnal
good producers, the latter by the technology monopolist).
The equilibrium in this economy is straightforward to characterize because (12) deﬁnes a
constant elasticity demand curve, so the optimal price of the monopolist that maximizes (13)
is simply the standard monopoly markup, i.e., 1/(1 − α) times the marginal cost of production
of the intermediate, 1 − α. This leads to an equilibrium monopoly price of χ =1 .M o r e o v e r ,
I continue to impose Assumption 2 or 2’ (which now apply to G, the subcomponent of the
production function (10)). Under these assumptions, the equilibrium will again be symmetric,
so qi (θ,χ)=α−1G(¯ Z, ¯ L,θ)χ−1/α for all i ∈ F, and given the monopoly price χ =1 ,w eh a v e
qi (θ)=qi ¡
θ,χ =1 , ¯ Z, ¯ L
¢
= α−1G(¯ Z, ¯ L,θ) for all i ∈ F. The proﬁts and the maximization
problem of the monopolist can then be expressed as
max
θ∈Θ
Π(θ)=G(¯ Z, ¯ L,θ) − C (θ). (14)
Thus we have established (proof in the text):
Proposition 3 (Equilibrium Theorem M) Suppose Assumption 2 or Assumption 2’ holds.
Then an equilibrium in Economy M is a solution to
max
θ∈Θ
G(¯ Z, ¯ L,θ) − C (θ)
and any solution to this problem is an equilibrium.
Relative to Economies D and C, the presence of the monopoly markup implies the presence
of greater distortions in this economy.14 More important for our purposes here, however, is
that again deﬁning F(¯ Z, ¯ L,θ)=G(¯ Z, ¯ L,θ)−C (θ), equilibrium technology in Economy M is a
solution to a problem identical to that in Economy C, and quite similar to the one in Economy
14For example, it can be veriﬁed that taking the behavior of the ﬁnal good producers as given, the socially
optimal allocation in this case would maximize (1 − α)
−1/α £
G(¯ Z, ¯ L,θ
i)
¤
−C (θ) rather than
£




14D. As in Economy C, F(¯ Z, ¯ L,θ) need not be globally concave in θ nor even locally concave in
(Z,θ) in the neighborhood of the equilibrium.
This result therefore shows that for the analysis of equilibrium bias, it is not important
whether technology choices are at the ﬁrm level or at the centralized level (resulting from some
R&D or other research process), and also whether they are made to maximize social surplus
or monopoly proﬁts. But we will see that whether F(¯ Z, ¯ L,θ) is jointly concave in (Z,θ) will
play an important role in the results.
Finally, it can be veriﬁed that in this economy equilibrium factor prices are given by wZj =
(1 − α)
−1 ∂G(¯ Z, ¯ L,θ)/∂Zj and wLj =( 1 − α)
−1 ∂G(¯ Z, ¯ L,θ)/∂Lj, which are proportional to
the derivatives of the F function deﬁned as F(¯ Z, ¯ L,θ)=G(¯ Z, ¯ L,θ) − C (θ). So to facilitate
comparison with Economies D and C, with a slight abuse of terminology I will refer to the
derivatives of the F function as the “equilibrium factor prices” even in Economy M.
3 Relative Equilibrium Bias
The previous section established that in three diﬀerent environments, with diﬀerent market
structures and conceptions of technology choice, the characterization of equilibrium technol-
ogy boils down to an identical maximization problem–the maximization of some function
F(¯ Z, ¯ L,θ) where ¯ Z and ¯ L are the factor supplies in the economy. In this and the next two
sections, I make use of this characterization to derive a number of results about equilibrium
bias of technology choice.
This section analyzes relative equilibrium bias, and for that reason, throughout I focus on
a more specialized economy with only two factors, L and Z (i.e., M =1and N =1 ), and
θ ∈ Θ ⊂ RK for some K ≥ 1,s ot h a tF : R+×R+×RK → R+. Moreover, suppose that
Z ∈ Z ⊂ R+ , L ∈ L ⊂ R+,a n dt h a tΘ is a convex compact subset of RK with the jth
component denoted by θj. Finally, I assume that F is twice continuously diﬀerentiable in
(Z,L,θ).
Recall that, in a two-factor economy, relative equilibrium bias is deﬁned as the eﬀect of
technology on the marginal product (price) of a factor relative to the marginal product (price)








when employment levels (factor proportions) are given by (Z,L) and the technology is θ.15
15Recall that F(¯ L, ¯ Z,θ) either corresponds to the production function of the ﬁrms (Economy D) or we have
15From the twice diﬀerentiability of F, these marginal products are also diﬀerentiable functions
of Z and L. Then we have the following deﬁnitions:16
Deﬁnition 4 An increase in technology θj for some j =1 ,...,K is relatively biased towards
factor Z at




¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L,θ
¢
/wL




This deﬁnition simply expresses what it means for a technology to be relatively biased
towards a factor (similarly a decrease in θj is relatively biased towards factor Z, if the derivative
in Deﬁnition 4 is non-positive). From this deﬁnition, it is clear that (weak) relative equilibrium
bias should correspond to a change in technology θ in a direction biased towards Z in response
to an increase in ¯ Z (or ¯ Z/¯ L); this is stated in the next deﬁnition.17
Deﬁnition 5 Denote the equilibrium technology at factor supplies
¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L
¢
∈ Z×Lby θ
¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L
¢
,
and assume that ∂θj
¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L
¢
/∂Z exists at
¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L
¢
for all for all j =1 ,...,K. Then there is relative
equilibrium bias at
¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L,θ






¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L
¢¢
/wL
¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L,θ








Notice that the deﬁnition of relative equilibrium bias requires the (overall) change in tech-
nology in response to an increase in ¯ Z to be biased towards Z at the point




¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L
¢
/∂Z exists for all j. The statement is not qualiﬁed with “towards Z”s i n c e
relative equilibrium bias is also equivalent to a decline in Z inducing a change in technology
relatively biased against Z. Finally, the requirement that ∂θj
¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L
¢
/∂Z exists for all j used in
this deﬁnition will be further discussed below (in particular, see the discussion after Theorem
3 in the next section).
F(¯ L, ¯ Z,θ)=G(¯ L, ¯ Z,θ) − C (θ),w h e r eG(¯ L, ¯ Z,θ) is the production function of the ﬁrms (Economy C) or a
subcomponent of the production function (Economy M). In both cases, the derivatives of F with respect to Z
and L deﬁne the marginal products of these factors. With a slight abuse of terminology, I will refer to F(¯ L, ¯ Z,θ)
as “the production function”.
16For this section, all deﬁnitions are “local” in the sense that, I will only look at the eﬀect of small changes
in factor supplies. This is why they are expressed in terms of derivatives. I do not add this qualiﬁcation to
simplify terminology.
17Throughout this section, I focus on changes in the supply of factor Z, which is also equivalent to a change
in relative supplies Z/L (with L kept constant). Moreover, I denote the change in equilibrium technology by
∂θj
¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L
¢
/∂Z rather than dθj
¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L
¢
/dZ since θ is not generally only a function of Z. I reserve the notation
d(wZ/wL)/dZ to denote the total change in relative (or absolute) wages, which includes the technological
adjustment, and contrast this with the partial change ∂ (wZ/wL)/∂Z, which holds technology constant (see,
for example, (16)).
16T h en e x td e ﬁnition introduces the more stringent concept of strong relative bias, which
requires that in response to an increase in ¯ Z, technology changes so much that the overall
eﬀect (after the induced change in technology) is to increase the relative price of factor Z.
Deﬁnition 6 Denote the equilibrium technology at factor supplies
¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L
¢
∈ Z×Lby θ
¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L
¢
,
and assume that ∂θj
¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L
¢
/∂Z exists at
¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L
¢
for all j =1 ,...,K. Then there is strong rela-
tive equilibrium bias at
¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L,θ
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¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L
¢¢
/wL
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¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L
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/wL
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By comparing the latter two deﬁnitions, it is clear that there will be strong relative equi-
librium bias if the sum of the expressions in (15) over j =1 ,...,K is large enough to dominate
the direct (negative) eﬀect of the increase in relative supplies on relative wages (which is the
ﬁrst term in (16)).
The main result in this section is that the conjecture about relative equilibrium bias applies
in a world with only factor-augmenting technologies, but not more generally. Before deriving
these results, it is useful to clarify the notions introduced so far using an example, which
captures the main ﬁndings in Acemoglu (1998, 2002), but in the context of Economy C or M
studied above rather than in the models of the original papers. In particular, the next example
considers an environment equivalent to Economy C or M above, with constant returns to scale
in L and Z. This example will also clarify one possible meaning of the Hicks’s quote discussed
above (see in particular footnote 20).










where θ =( AZ,AL).I np a r t i c u l a r ,AZ and AL are two separate factor-augmenting technology
terms, γ ∈ (0,1) is a distribution parameter which determines how important the two factors
are, and σ ∈ (0,∞) is the elasticity of substitution between the two factors. When σ = ∞,
the two factors are perfect substitutes, and the production function is linear. When σ =1 ,t h e
production function is Cobb-Douglas, and when σ =0 , there is no substitution between the
two factors, and the production function is Leontieﬀ. Since there are two technology terms, I
take θ =( AZ,AL) ∈ Θ = R2
+.
17Suppose that factor supplies are given by
¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L
¢
. Then the relative marginal product of















The relative marginal product of Z is decreasing in the relative abundance of Z, ¯ Z/¯ L.T h i s
is the usual substitution eﬀect, leading to a downward-sloping relative demand curve. This
expression also makes it clear that the measure of relative bias towards Z will correspond to
¯ θ =( AZ/AL)
(σ−1)/σ,18 since higher levels of ¯ θ increase the marginal product of Z relative to
labor for all values of σ (recall Deﬁnition 4). To derive the results similar to those in Acemoglu
(1998, 2002) in the context of Economy C or M, suppose that the costs of producing new
technologies are ηZA1+δ
Z and ηLA1+δ
L , where δ>0. Despite the fact that δ>0 introduces
diminishing returns in the choice of technology, the production possibilities set of this economy
is nonconvex, since there is choice both over the factors of production, Z and L, and the
technologies, AZ and AL (so that the function (17) exhibits increasing returns in L, Z, AZ
and AL). From Proposition 2 or 3, the problem of choosing equilibrium technology is the


















Taking the ratio of the ﬁrst-order necessary and suﬃcient conditions with respect to AZ and



















This equation can also be expressed in an alternative form, both useful for the discussion here









Recall that there will be weak equilibrium bias, if the expression in Deﬁnition 4 is nonnegative.
Using equation (18), wZ














Z separately. Using this (and preparing for Theorem 1), we can express the condition




L as two separate technology terms, both relatively
biased towards Z, but clearly focusing on ¯ θ is more economical.
It is important that the bias towards factor Z is ¯ θ =( AZ/AL)
(σ−1)/σ, not AZ/AL, as is sometimes confusingly
and incorrectly stated in the applied literature. AZ/AL is the ratio of Z-augmenting to L-augmenting technology.
When σ>1, an increase in AZ/A L increases the relative marginal product of Z,w h i l ew h e nσ<1, an increase
in AZ/AL reduces the relative marginal product of Z.
































which is always nonnegative, thus establishing that there is always weak relative equilib-
rium bias (as claimed by the conjecture in the Introduction). Alternatively, the same re-
sult follows by looking directly at the measure of relative bias towards Z introduced above,
¯ θ =( AZ/AL)















w h i c hi sa l w a y si n c r e a s i n gi n ¯ Z/¯ L.20
Next to investigate the conditions under which there is strong relative equilibrium bias, we















































σ − 2 − δ
1+σδ
> 0. (22)
19Expressing everything in terms of log changes rather than absolute changes is simply for convenience
(and also useful for Theorem 1). In particular, note that as long as x>0 and a>0, ∂x/∂a T 0 if
and only if ∂ lnx/∂ lna T 0.M o r e o v e r , s i n c e L is kept constant, ∂x/∂(Z/L)=( ∂x/∂Z)L,s ow h e n e v e r




¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L
¢¢
/wL
¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L
¢¢
/∂θj × ∂θj
¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L
¢
/∂Z ≥ 0.
20More explicitly, returning to the discussion in footnote 18, when σ>1,a ni n c r e a s ei n¯ Z/¯ L increases AZ/AL,
w h i c hi nt u r nr a i s e swZ/wL at given factor proportions. In contrast when σ<1, an increase in ¯ Z/¯ L reduces
AZ/AL, but in this case, AZ/AL is relatively biased against factor Z (it is biased towards factor L), so a decrease
in AZ/AL again raises wZ/wL.
At this point, we can also return to Hicks’ quote. This example (and the theorem that follows) show that the
claim in Hicks’ quote is not true for relative bias of technical change; an increase in the abundance of a factor that
reduces its price will make technology relatively biased towards that factor. However, if we interpret the quote
in terms of relative factor-augmenting changes, equation (20) shows that it is true when σ<1.T h e r e f o r e ,o n e
interpretation of Hicks’ claim is that the increase in the abundance of a factor will cause technology relatively
augmenting the other factor as long as the elasticity of substitution between the two factors is less than one.
19so that when σ>2+δ, the relative demand curve for factors is upward-sloping and there is
strong relative equilibrium bias. In this example, this result can be obtained more transparently
by substituting for A∗
Z/A∗
































σ − 2 − δ
1+σδ
,
which conﬁrms the result of strong relative equilibrium bias when σ>2+δ s h o w ni n( 2 2 ) . 21
This example therefore illustrates the possibility of both weak and strong relative bias
results in an economy with a nonconvex aggregate production possibilities set. In particular,
technological change induced in response to an increase in Z is always (weakly) relatively
biased towards Z, and moreover, if the condition σ>2+δ is satisﬁed, there is also strong
relative bias. This example also corresponds to the most general result that exists in the
literature (see Acemoglu, 2002). Nevertheless, the structure of the economy is quite special,
in particular, it incorporates a speciﬁc aggregate production function and cost functions for
undertaking research. I next establish that with a more general setup, but still with two-factors
and factor-augmenting technologies, the same results hold. Before stating this theorem, recall
that a function f (x,y) is homothetic in x and y,i f(∂f (x,y)/∂x)/(∂f (x,y)/∂y) is only a
function of x/y for all x and y.
Theorem 1 (Relative Equilibrium Bias with Factor-Augmenting Technologies) Con-
sider Economy C or M with two-factors, (Z,L) ∈ Z×L⊂R2
+, and two factor-augmenting
technologies, (AZ,A L) ∈ R2
+, such that the production function is F (AZZ,ALL). Assume
that F is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, concave and homothetic in its two arguments, and
that the costs of producing technologies AZ and AL, C (AZ,A L), is also twice continuously
diﬀerentiable, strictly convex and homothetic in AZ and AL.D e n o t e t h e ﬁrst derivatives of
C (AZ,A L) by CZ and CL.L e t σ be the (local) elasticity of substitution between Z and L
deﬁned by σ = −
∂ ln(Z/L)
∂ ln(wZ/wL)
¯ ¯ ¯ AZ
AL
,a n dl e tδ =
∂ ln(CZ(AZ,AL)/CL(AZ,AL))
∂ ln(AZ/AL) . Finally, suppose that
21In Acemoglu (2002), the condition for upward-sloping relative demand curves was σ>2−δ
0 for some other
parameter δ
0 > 0, which essentially corresponds to −δ here. The reason is that in that context, as in many
endogenous growth models, the technology allowed for knowledge-spillovers, and the parameter δ
0 measured how
much a particular type of technology beneﬁts from past innovations in the same line, adding another degree of
non-convexity. Here a higher value of the parameter δ makes the aggregate technology of the economy more
“convex” and thus upward-sloping relative demandc u r v e sl e s sl i k e l y .S e ea l s oT h e o r e m8b e l o w .
20factor supplies are given by
¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L
¢
and denote equilibrium technologies by (A∗
Z,A ∗
L), and equi-
librium factor prices by wZ









. Then we have that for all













































σ − 2 − δ
1+σδ
, (26)
so that there is strong relative equilibrium bias if σ − 2 − δ>0.






AZ ¯ Z,AL¯ L
¢
− C (AZ,A L).
























where FZ denotes the derivative of F with respect to its ﬁrst argument and FL denotes the
derivative with respect to the second, and CZ and CL are deﬁned as in the theorem. Recalling












































Now since F is homothetic, FZ/FL is only a function of Z/L and AZ/AL.M o r e o v e r ,s i n c eC
is homothetic, CZ/CL is also only a function of AZ/AL and δ in the theorem is well deﬁned.
















































as in (24). Then (25) immediately follows by combining this with (29), and by the same
argument as in Example 1 (in particular footnote 19), this establishes weak equilibrium bias.
Finally, (26) and strong equilibrium bias (under the condition that σ>2+δ)f o l l o wf r o m

























σ − 2 − δ
1+σδ
.
The major result of this theorem is that the insights from Example 1 generalize in a fairly
natural way as long as the potential menu of technological possibilities only consists of two
technologies, one augmenting Z and the other L.22 The only diﬀerence is that the parameter
δ and the elasticity of substitution σ are no longer constants, but are functions of AL, AZ,
¯ L and ¯ Z, so changes in factor supplies will have eﬀects that depend on the local elasticity of
substitution and the local value of δ. Nevertheless, the change in AZ/AL (or in (AZ/AL)
(σ−1)/σ
as in Example 1) induced by an increase in ¯ Z is always relatively biased towards Z,a n dt h e r e
is strong equilibrium relative bias if σ>2+δ. Therefore, this theorem establishes that
an environment with a menu of technological possibilities featuring only factor-augmenting
technologies is suﬃcient to obtain both a general weak relative bias theorem,a n dt h epossibility
of strong relative bias (when the local elasticity of substitution between factors, σ,i ss u ﬃciently
high and the parameter δ is relatively low).
However, once we depart from the world of Theorem 1 with the production function
F (AZZ,ALL), it is possible for the supply of factor Z to increase, and in response, tech-
nology to change in a direction relatively biased against this factor (i.e., towards factor L),
thus disproving the conjecture in the Introduction. This is stated in the next theorem and
proved by providing two counterexamples.
Theorem 2 With a general menu of technologies, there is not necessarily relative equilibrium
bias. That is, suppose that ∂θj
¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L
¢
/∂Z exists at
¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L
¢




¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L
¢¢
/wL
¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L,θ








22The additional assumptions are that F and C are homothetic.
22is possible.
I will present two counterexamples highlighting diﬀerent reasons for why there is no such
general relative bias theorem. For simplicity, both of the examples focus on economies with
a single dimension of technology. The ﬁrst one shows that a choice over the elasticity of
substitution may lead to endogenous technological change biased against the factor that is
becoming more abundant.23 The second one shows that the form of the production function
in Theorem 1, F (AZZ,ALL),i si m p o r t a n tf o rt h er e s u l t .
Example 2 (Counterexample I) Consider an example of Economy C or M with the family






and cost of technology creation, C (θ),d e ﬁned over Θ =[ a,b] where b>a , that is convex and
twice continuously diﬀerentiable over the entire Θ,w i t hC0 denoting its ﬁrst derivative. From
Proposition 2 or 3, the choice of θ will maximize F (Z,L,θ)=G(Z,L,θ) − C (θ). Therefore,
at given factor supplies
¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L
¢
, the equilibrium technology choice θ satisﬁes
∂F
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´
/∂θ2 < 0.F r o mD e ﬁnition 4, a counterexample would correspond to
∆(wZ/wL) ≡
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From the Implicit Function Theorem,24 this is equivalent to
∆(wZ/wL) ≡−
∂wZ
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23See Benabou (2005) for a model of endogenous choice of the elasticity of substitution as a function of the
inequality of human capital among workers in the economy.
24See, for example, Rudin (1964), Theorem 9.18, or Simon and Blume (1994), Theorem 15.2.
23Now diﬀerentiate the expression in (31) with respect to ¯ Z and to simplify notation denote
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˜ θ ln ¯ L
´h
¯ Z
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If this expression is negative, then in response to an increase in ¯ Z, ˜ θ = θ
¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L
¢
will decline.














which is increasing in ˜ θ as long as Z>L .N o ws u p p o s et h a tw es t a r tw i t h¯ L =1and ¯ Z =2 ,
and choose the function C (θ) such that ˜ θ =0 .1.T h e n
∂2F
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1+2 0.1¤−1 +( 0 .1ln2+1)
∝− 7.28 − 1+0 .32 + 1.07 < 0,
which is clearly negative, so
∂wZ
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and (33) is satisﬁed, providing a counterexample to the conjecture. Put diﬀerently, in this
case the increase in ¯ Z induces a decline in ˜ θ, which is a change in technology relatively biased
against Z.
Example 3 (Counterexample II)25 Consider again an example of Economy C or M with
a family of production functions satisfying Assumption 2’:
G(Z,L,θ)=Zθ+ Lθ2,
and cost of creating new technologies given by C0θ2/2 with C0 > 0 for all θ ∈ Θ = R and
L ∈ L ⊂ (0,C 0/2). This production function exhibits constant returns to scale in Z and L,
25I thank Rabah Amir for suggesting an example along these lines.
24and F (Z,L,θ)=G(Z,L,θ) − C (θ) is strictly concave in θ for L ∈ L. The optimal choice of
θ satisﬁes
θ




C0 − 2¯ L
,
and is thus increasing in ¯ Z for ¯ L ∈ L. Relative price of the two factors is given by: wZ (θ)/wL (θ)=
θ−1, which is clearly decreasing in θ. Therefore, an increase in ¯ Z will induce technological
change (or technology adoption) relatively biased against Z. Theorem 1 does not apply in this
case since the production function does not take the form F (AZZ,ALL), even though it is
homothetic in Z and L.
Theorem 1 explains the reason for the negative result in Theorem 2. The conjecture about
relative bias does not apply in these examples because the menu of technologies does not take
this simple form with one technology augmenting factor Z and the other factor L. Although
this type of factor-augmenting technology may be an interesting and empirically important
special case, one may be interested in a more general theorem that applies without imposing a
speciﬁc structure on the interaction between technologies and the factors of production. This
is especially the case when we consider technology choices that correspond to shifts from one
type of organizational form or organization of production to another, such as those experienced
during recent decades, during the emergence of the American System of Manufacturing, or
during the Industrial Revolution. These shifts not only change the productivity of diﬀerent
factors, but the way the whole production process is organized and thus naturally also the
elasticity of substitution between factors.
Examples 2 and 3 show that a general theorem is not possible for relative bias. Nevertheless,
it is also important to emphasize that these examples and Theorem 2 do not imply that with
the general menu of technologies, changes in relative supplies will cause technical change that
it is relatively biased against the more abundant factor. In many cases, weak equilibrium bias
will still apply, but without imposing more structure, we do not have a general theorem.
In the next section, we will see that such a theorem can be derived for absolute bias. In
fact, Examples 2 and 3 already hint at this possibility. The reason why induced technology (in
response to an increase in ¯ Z) is not relatively biased towards Z in both examples is that the
induced change in technology increases wZ (at given factor proportions), but it has an even
larger (positive) eﬀect on the marginal product of the other factor, wL.26
26To see this more explicitly, note that ∂
2F
¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L
¢¢
/∂θ∂Z = ∂wZ
¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L
¢¢
/∂θ and rewrite
254 Equilibrium Absolute Bias
Examples 2 and 3 show that there is no general theorem about relative equilibrium bias unless
we restrict ourselves to factor-augmenting technologies. The obvious question is whether there
is a general result for absolute bias. The answer is yes and is the focus of this section. Recall
that absolute bias refers to whether new technology increases the marginal product of a factor.
The main results in this section will therefore show that in response to increases in the supply
of a factor (or a set of factors), technology will change endogenously in a direction absolutely
biased towards this factor (or this set of factors).
As stated in the Introduction, this section focuses on weak (absolute) bias results and
presents both local and global theorems. I begin with the local theorem, which applies to the
case with N =1 , i.e., to changes in the supply of a single factor, Z.





¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
¢
(34)
where ¯ L denotes the supply of these other inputs and ¯ Z denotes the supply of Z.L e t u s
denote the marginal product (or price) of this factor by wZ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
¢
= ∂F
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
¢
/∂Z when
t h ee m p l o y m e n tl e v e l so ff a c t o r sa r eg i v e nb y
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
and the technology is θ.F o r t h e l o c a l
result I will also take Θ to be a convex compact subset of RK for some K ≥ 1 and assume that
F is also twice diﬀerentiable in (Z,θ), which implies that wZ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
¢
is diﬀerentiable in θ.
Deﬁnition 7 Let θ ∈ Θ ⊂ RK. An increase in technology θj for some j =1 ,...,K is locally
absolutely biased towards factor Z at








Conversely we could deﬁne a decrease in technology θ as locally absolutely biased towards
factor Z if the same derivative is nonpositive. Notice also that the local bias deﬁnition requires
the bias for only small changes in technology and only at the current factor proportions






¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L
¢¢
/wL
¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L,θ




¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L,θ




¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L,θ





¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L
¢¢
is constant, this is equivalent to equation (40) in the proof of Theorem 3 in the next
section and is always nonnegative. However, as Example 2 and 3 show, a large eﬀect of θ on wL can reverse
this result.
26The global deﬁnition below will require a similar directional change but for all magnitudes of
changes in supplies and at all factor proportions. Next we deﬁne (local) equilibrium absolute
bias analogously to relative equilibrium bias.
Deﬁnition 8 Let θ ∈ Θ ⊂ RK. Denote the equilibrium technology at factor supplies




¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
and assume that ∂θj
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
/∂Z exists at
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
for all j =1 ,...,K. Then
there is local absolute equilibrium bias at
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ






¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ








In words, this deﬁnition requires the induced combined change in the components of tech-
nology resulting from an increase in ¯ Z to be towards increasing the marginal product of factor
Z.A si nD e ﬁnition 5 for relative equilibrium bias, this deﬁnition also requires ∂θj
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
/∂Z
to exist for all j. The next theorem will also be stated under this assumption, which can
alternatively be replaced by Assumption A1 below.
Theorem 3 (Local Absolute Bias) Consider Economy D, C or M. Suppose that Θ is a
convex subset of RK and F (Z,L,θ) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable in (Z,θ).L e t t h e
equilibrium technology at factor supplies
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
be θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
,a n da s s u m et h a tθ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
is in
the interior of Θ and that ∂θj
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
/∂Z exists at
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
for all j =1 ,...,K. Then, there is
local absolute equilibrium bias at all
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢




¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ




¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
∂Z
≥ 0 for all
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
∈ Z×L . (36)
Moreover, if ∂θj
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢




¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ








Proof. The proof follows from the Implicit Function Theorem. For expositional clarity, I
ﬁrst present the case where θ ∈ Θ ⊂ R.S i n c eΘ ⊂ R and by hypothesis, the equilibrium choice
of θ is in the interior of Θ,w eh a v e
∂F
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ





¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢¢
/∂θ2 ≤ 0.S i n c e ∂θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
/∂Z exists at
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
by hypothesis, from
the Implicit Function Theorem it must be equal to
∂θ





¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
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¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢¢
/∂θ2, (39)
27so we must have ∂2F
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢¢
/∂θ2 6=0 , i.e., ∂2F
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢¢
/∂θ2 < 0.T h i s i n
turn implies:
∂wZ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ










¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ





¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢¢
/∂θ2 ≥ 0, (40)
establishing (36). Moreover, if ∂θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
/∂Z 6=0 , then from (39), ∂wZ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢¢
/∂θ 6=
0, so (40) holds with strict inequality, establishing (37).
Next, let us look at the general case where θ ∈ Θ ⊂ RK with K>1.L e t ∆wZ be the
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¢¢¤0 £
∇Zθ






¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢¢¤
is a K×1 vector of changes in wZ in response to each component
of θ ∈ Θ ⊂ RK,
£
∇Zθ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢¤
is the Jacobian of θ with respect to Z, i.e., a K × 1 vector of
changes in each component of θ in response to the change in ¯ Z, and for a matrix (vector) v, v0





¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢¢¤
is also the K × 1 vector of changes in wZ in response to
each component of θ.S i n c e∂θj
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
/∂Z exists at
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
for all j,t h eg r a d i e n t∇Zθ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
also exists and from the Implicit Function Theorem, it satisﬁes
∇Zθ





¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ




¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ




¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢¢
is the K × K Hessian of F with respect to θ.T h e f a c t t h a t
θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
is a solution to the maximization problem (34) implies that ∇2
θθF
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢¢
is
negative semi-deﬁnite. That ∇Zθ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
exists then implies that ∇2
θθF
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢¢
is non-





¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L






¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
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¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢¢¤
≥ 0,
which establishes (36) for the case in which Θ ⊂ RK.
28By the deﬁnition of a negative deﬁnite matrix B, x0Bx < 0 for all x 6=0 ,s ot oe s t a b l i s h
the strict inequality in (37) in this case, it suﬃces that one element of ∇Zθ




¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
/∂Z 6=0for one j =1 ,...K, completing the proof.
This theorem therefore shows that once we shift our focus to absolute bias, there is a fairly
general result. Under minimal assumptions (further discussed below), technological change
induced by a change in factor supplies will be biased towards the factor that has become
more abundant. There is a clear parallel here with the LeChatelier principle of Samuelson
(1947), but also a number of important diﬀerences. First, this theorem concerns how marginal
products (or prices) change as a result of induced technological changes resulting from changes
in factor supplies rather than the elasticity of short-run and long-run demand curves. Second,
it applies to the equilibrium of an economy not to the maximization problem of a single ﬁrm.
Nevertheless, the parallel is also important, since we can think of the change in technology
as happening in the “long run”, in which case Theorem 3 states that long-run changes in
marginal products (factor prices) will be less than those in the short run because of induced
technological change or technology adoption.
Theorem 3 was stated and proved under the assumption that ∂θj
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
/∂Z exists at
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
for all j =1 ,...,K. This assumption entails two restrictions. The ﬁrst is the usual
non-singularity requirement to enable an application of the Implicit Function Theorem, i.e.,
that the Hessian of F with respect to θ, ∇2
θθF
¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L
¢¢
, is non-singular at the point
θ
¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L
¢
(see, for example, Rudin, 1964, Theorem 9.18, or Simon and Blume, 1994, Theorem
15.2; recall also the argument in the proof of Theorem 3). The second is more subtle; since
we have not made global concavity assumptions (except in Economy D), a small change in Z
may shift the technology choice from one local optimum to another, thus essentially making
∂θj
¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L
¢
/∂Z inﬁnite (or undeﬁned). This possibility is also ruled out by this assumption.
In fact, the assumption that ∂θj
¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L
¢
/∂Z exists at
¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L
¢
can be replaced by the following:
Assumption A1: ∇2
θθF
¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L
¢¢
is non-singular, and there exists ξ>0 such that for
all θ0 ∈ Θ with ∂F
¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L,θ0¢
/∂θ =0and θ0 6= θ
¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L
¢
,w eh a v eF
¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L,θ




¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L,θ0¢
>ξ .
The second part of the assumption ensures that the peaks of the function F
¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L,θ
¢
in
θ are “well separated”, in the sense that in response to a small change in factor supplies,
there will not be a shift in the global optimum of θ from one local optimum to another.27
27Put diﬀerently, suppose that the equilibrium maximization problem (34) has multiple local maxima, and
29Consequently, Assumption A1 is equivalent to assuming that ∂θj
¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L
¢
/∂Z exists at
¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L
¢
for all j. A straightforward condition to ensure that Assumption A1 is satisﬁed is to assume
that F is strictly quasi-concave in θ, though this is considerably stronger than Assumption A1.
Since it is more intuitive to directly assume that the derivatives ∂θj
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
/∂Z’s exist rather
than imposing Assumption A1, I state the relevant theorems under this direct assumption.
But depending on taste, Assumption A1 can be substituted in Theorem 3 and some of the
subsequent theorems.
Three shortcomings of Theorem 3 are apparent. First, it applies to changes in the supply
of a single factor. Second, it applies only to local (small) changes. Third, and perhaps most
importantly, as Deﬁnition 8 makes it clear, equilibrium bias is a local phenomenon. For
example, an increase in ¯ Z may change θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
in a direction biased towards Z at factor
proportions
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
, but this change may in fact be biased against Z at some diﬀerent factor
proportions, say
¡ ¯ Z0, ¯ L0¢
. Similar to Milgrom and Roberts’ (1996) generalization of LeChatelier
principle, there is a global version of Theorem 3, which will strengthen and generalize it to deal
w i t ha l lo ft h e s ep r o b l e m s . 28 Like the results in Milgrom and Roberts (1996), this theorem also
uses tools from the theory of monotone comparative statics. I start with changes in a single
factor, and then generalize it to multiple factors.
Deﬁnition 9 Let θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
be the equilibrium technology choice in an economy with factor
supplies
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
. We say that there is global absolute equilibrium bias if for any ¯ Z0, ¯ Z ∈ Z,
¯ Z0 ≥ ¯ Z =⇒ wZ
³
˜ Z,¯ L,θ





¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢´
for all ˜ Z ∈ Z and ¯ L ∈L.
Note that there are two notions of “globality” in this deﬁnition. First, the increase from
¯ Z to ¯ Z0 is not limited to small changes. Second, the change in technology induced by this
increase is required to increase the price of factor Z for all ˜ Z ∈ Z. Once again, this deﬁnition
can be made stronger by requiring strict inequality.
denote the set of these maxima at factor proportions
¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L
¢
by Θ
s ¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L
¢
. All of these solutions satisfy the
ﬁrst-order necessary conditions of the equilibrium maximization problem (34). Suppose ˆ θ
¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L
¢
is a vector
that satisﬁes these ﬁrst-order necessary conditions. Given the non-singularity assumption (ﬁrst part of Assump-
tion A1), the Implicit Function Theorem can be applied to ˆ θ
¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L
¢
. However, this does not guarantee that
∂θ
¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L
¢
/∂Z exists, since θ
¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L
¢
corresponds to the global maximum of (34), and the change in Z may shift
the global maximum from ˆ θ
¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L
¢
to some other ˜ θ
¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L
¢
∈ Θ
s ¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L
¢
. The second part of Assumption A1 rules
this possibility out by imposing that one of the solutions to the ﬁrst-order necessary conditions gives uniformly
higher value, so that a small (inﬁnitesimal) change in Z cannot induce a shift from one element of Θ




28A fourth potential shortcoming is that Theorem 3 is stated assuming that θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
is in the interior of Θ.
This is straightforward to relax. Nevertheless, since the global theorem, Theorem 4, naturally covers the case
in which θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
may be at the boundary of Θ, I do not introduce the additional notation to deal with this
case in Theorem 3 (see also the proof of Theorem 6).
30To state the main results, we need a number of technical deﬁnitions. Appendix B deﬁnes
lattices, supermodular functions and (strictly) increasing diﬀerences. Both supermodularity
and increasing diﬀerences loosely correspond to the notion of complementarities, i.e., the re-
quirement that a change in a function resulting from an increase in one argument is itself
increasing in the other arguments. In the case of continuously diﬀerentiable functions, we have
ap a r t i c u l a r l ys i m p l ed e ﬁnition of supermodularity (see, e.g., Topkis, 1998):
Deﬁnition 10 Let x =( x 1,...,x n) be a vector in X ⊂ Rn, and suppose that the real-valued
function f (x) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable in x.T h e n f (x) is supermodular on X if
a n do n l yi f∂2f (x)/∂xi∂xi0 ≥ 0 for all x ∈ X and for all i 6= i0.
Increasing diﬀerences is a slightly weaker concept again related to complementarities:
Deﬁnition 11 Let X and T be partially ordered sets. Then a function f (x,t) deﬁned on
a subset S of X × T has increasing diﬀerences in (x,t), if for all t00 >t , f (x,t00) − f (x,t)
is nondecreasing in x.M o r e o v e r ,f (x,t) has strictly increasing diﬀerences in (x,t), if for all
t00 >t , f (x,t00) − f (x,t) is strictly increasing in x.
Lemma 2 in Appendix B shows that (strict) supermodularity in (x,t) implies (strict) in-
creasing diﬀerences in (x,t). With these deﬁnitions, we can use Topkis’ Monotonicity Theorem,
given as Theorem 10 in Appendix B. Using this approach, we now have:
Theorem 4 (Global Equilibrium Bias) Consider Economy D, C or M. Suppose that Θ
is a lattice, let ¯ Z be the convex hull of Z, let θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
be the equilibrium technology at
factor proportions
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
, and suppose that F (Z,L,θ) is continuously diﬀerentiable in Z,
supermodular in θ on Θ for all Z ∈ ¯ Z and L ∈L, and exhibits strictly increasing diﬀerences
in (Z,θ) on ¯ Z×Θ for all L ∈L, then there is global absolute equilibrium bias,i . e . ,f o ra n y
¯ Z0, ¯ Z ∈ Z, ¯ Z0 ≥ ¯ Z implies
θ
¡ ¯ Z0, ¯ L
¢
≥ θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢










¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢´
for all ˜ Z ∈ Z and ¯ L ∈L.
Proof. The proof follows from the application of Theorem 10 in Appendix B. Given the
continuity and the supermodularity of F (Z,L,θ) on ¯ Z×Θ and the fact that Θ is a lattice
and Z is a subset of R therefore also a lattice, Theorem 10 in Appendix B implies that
31the set of equilibrium technologies is a non-empty, compact and complete sublattice of Θ.
Moreover, supermodularity of F in θ and strict increasing diﬀerences in (Z,θ) implies that
¯ Z0 ≥ ¯ Z =⇒ θ
¡ ¯ Z0, ¯ L
¢
≥ θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
for all ¯ L ∈L.N e x t( s t r i c t )i n c r e a s i n gd i ﬀerences of F (Z,L,θ)




/∂Z is increasing in θ for all ˜ Z ∈










¡ ¯ Z0, ¯ L
¢´
/∂Z, the conclusion follows.
An important feature of this theorem, as opposed to the local theorem, Theorem 3, is
that consistent with Deﬁnition 9, the induced change in technology does not only increase the
marginal product of factor Z (which is becoming more abundant) at the current supply, ¯ Z,
but does so at all points in the set Z. In this sense, Theorem 4 is indeed a global theorem,
applying both for large magnitudes of changes and applying to all admissible levels of factor
supplies.29
Also in this theorem, the fact that θ
¡ ¯ Z0, ¯ L
¢
≥ θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
(say rather than θ




¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
) is not particularly important, since the order over the set Θ is not speciﬁed. It
could be that as ¯ Z increases some measure of technology t declines. But in this case, this mea-
sure would correspond to a type of technology biased against factor Z.I fs o ,w ec a ns i m p l y
change the order over this parameter, e.g., we can consider changes in ˜ t = −t rather than t.
Remark 1 Inspection of Theorem 10 in Appendix B will show that Theorem 4 also applies,
when the assumption that F is supermodular in θ is replaced with the weaker assumption that
F is quasi-supermodular in θ, which is an ordinal property introduced by Milgrom and Shannon
(1994). But Example 4 below shows that (strict) increasing diﬀerences cannot be replaced
with the (strict) single crossing property of Milgrom and Shannon (1994). Thus, interestingly,
Theorem 4 requires a mixture of ordinal and cardinal conditions. Nevertheless, I stated the
result under the stronger assumption of supermodularity since quasi-supermodularity is only
deﬁned in Appendix B.
Remark 2 T h e o r e m4c a na l s ob es t a t e da s s u m i n go n l yi n c r e a s i n gd i ﬀerences in (Z,θ) rather
than strict increasing diﬀerences. But in this case, the conclusion that θ
¡ ¯ Z0, ¯ L
¢
≥ θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
would only apply to the greatest and the least elements of the set of equilibrium technologies
(see Theorem 2.8.1 in Topkis, 1998). The greatest and the least elements of the maximizer set
always exist since, given the assumptions of Theorem 4, Theorem 10 ensures that the maximizer
29It is also useful to note that Theorem 3 could be derived from Theorem 4 by restricting the set Θ to an
arbitrarily small ball around θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
and then taking a second-order Taylor approximation to F as in Corollary
to Theorem 2 of Milgrom and Roberts (1996, p. 176).
32set is a complete lattice. Given this result, in the discussion I will simplify the terminology by
often referring to increasing diﬀerences rather than strict increasing diﬀerences.
Two immediate related corollaries of this theorem are also useful to note. Both of those
strengthen the results of the theorem to obtain strict inequalities. The ﬁrst states that this
i st h ec a s ew h e n e v e rθ
¡ ¯ Z0, ¯ L
¢
>θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
(thus is similar to the result on strict inequalities in
Theorem 3), while the second imposes additional conditions to ensure θ
¡ ¯ Z0, ¯ L
¢
>θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
.
Corollary 1 Suppose that the hypotheses in Theorem 4 hold. If in addition θ




¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
, we have wZ
³
˜ Z,¯ L,θ





¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢´









¡ ¯ Z0, ¯ L
¢´
/∂Z, θ
¡ ¯ Z0, ¯ L
¢
≥ θ




¡ ¯ Z0, ¯ L
¢
6= θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
combined with the fact that F exhibits strict increasing diﬀerences in
(Z,θ) establish this result.
Corollary 2 Suppose that the hypotheses in Theorem 4 hold. Suppose in addition that Θ is





/∂Z is strictly increasing in θ for all ˜ Z ∈ Z.C o n s i d e ra n y¯ Z0, ¯ Z ∈ Z, such that
¯ Z0 > ¯ Z and ¯ L ∈ L, and suppose that θ
¡ ¯ Z0, ¯ L
¢
and θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
are in the interior of Θ. Then, we
have that θ
¡ ¯ Z0, ¯ L
¢
>θ










¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢´
.
Proof. This corollary follows immediately from the Strong Monotonicity Theorem, Theo-
rem 11, in Appendix B.
An important implication of Theorem 4 and the subsequent corollaries is that we now have
a global version of Theorem 3, but at the expense of introducing more structure. In particular,
in addition to the relatively weak assumptions (in this context) that Z and Θ are lattices, we
need F to be (quasi-)supermodular in θ and to exhibit (strict) increasing diﬀerences in (Z,θ).
More importantly, there are limits to how much Theorems 3 and 4 can be generalized.
First, Theorem 3 does not apply for large changes in Z. In fact, quite interestingly, we cannot
take a series of small changes and turn them into a biased response for a large change in Z
(without the additional supermodularity and increasing diﬀerences assumption). Second, the
requirement of (strict) increasing diﬀerences in (Z,θ) in Theorem 4 cannot be dispensed with,
nor could it be replaced by the weaker conditions of single-crossing or quasi-supermodularity in
(Z,θ) of Milgrom and Shannon (1994)–see Appendix B for deﬁnitions. Third, the assumption
that F should exhibit increasing diﬀerences on the convex hull of Z rather than Z itself cannot
33be dispensed with either. The following example illustrates all these features by constructing
a simple economy which satisﬁes the local theorem, Theorem 3, at all points, but fails to
yield a global version of (absolute) bias because the production function does not exhibit
increasing diﬀerences in (Z,θ) on ¯ Z×Θ (though it satisﬁes single crossing in (Z,θ) and in
(θ,Z), and quasi-supermodularity in (Z,θ) and exhibits increasing diﬀerences on Z×Θ where
Z is nonconvex).





θ + A(θ)+B (L) and Z ∈ Z =[ 0 ,6] and Θ =[ 0 ,2] so that F is everywhere
increasing in Z (with the cost of creating technologies, C (θ), incorporated into the function
A(θ)). Suppose also that A(θ) is a strictly concave and continuously diﬀerentiable real-valued
function with the following boundary conditions to ensure interior solutions to the choice
of technology: A0 (0) > 0 and A0 (2) = −∞ (where A0 denotes A’s derivative), and B (L)
is an increasing function. F (Z,L,θ) satisﬁes all the conditions of Theorem 3 at all points
Z ∈ Z =[ 0 ,6] (since F is strictly concave in θ everywhere on Z×Θ =[ 0 ,6] × [0,2]), so we
have local absolute equilibrium bias at all points in Z×Θ.
However, F (Z,L,θ) is not supermodular nor does it satisfy increasing diﬀerences in (Z,θ),
since the cross-partial between Z and θ changes sign depending on whether Z is greater than
or less than 4. Consequently, it can be veriﬁed that there will not be global equilibrium bias
in this example.
To illustrate this, consider ¯ Z =1and ¯ Z0 =5as two potential supply levels of factor Z







,s ot h a t








satisﬁes A0 (θ(5)) = −15/8. The strict concavity of A(θ) implies that θ(5) >θ(1).M o r e o v e r ,
wZ (Z,θ)=1+( 1− Z/4)θ,s owZ (5,θ(5)) = 1−θ(5)/4 <w Z (5,θ(1)) = 1−θ(1)/4, contrary
to the claim in Theorem 4.
So why does the global theorem not work, while the local theorem does? The answer is
that the local theorem, Theorem 3, only refers to changes in technology that are absolutely
biased at the corresponding factor proportions. Consequently, when we change ¯ Z locally, say
from 1 to 1.1, this increases θ, which is absolutely biased towards Z around 1. But this change
is biased against Z when we look at ¯ Z =5 . This is the fundamental reason why applying
the local theorem, Theorem 3, successively will not give a global theorem and we need the
additional increasing diﬀerences (supermodularity) conditions (see also footnote 33 below for
further discussion on this point).
34This example can also be used to illustrate that increasing diﬀerences cannot be replaced by
the weaker single-crossing property, since F (Z,L,θ) may satisfy single crossing both in (Z,θ)
and (θ,Z). To illustrate this, let us take Θ = {θ(1),θ(5)} and suppose that θ(1) = 0 and
θ(5) = 1. Let us continue to take Z =[ 0 ,6]. First to check single crossing in (Z,θ), note that
since θ(1) = 0, F
¡ ¯ Z0, ¯ L,θ(1)
¢
>F
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ(1)
¢
whenever ¯ Z0 > ¯ Z. Therefore, we only have to
check that F
¡ ¯ Z0, ¯ L,θ(5)
¢
>F
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ(5)
¢
whenever ¯ Z0 > ¯ Z. This immediately follows from
the fact that θ(5) = 1, so that for all ¯ Z0, ¯ Z ∈ Z =[ 0 ,6] and ¯ Z0 > ¯ Z, ¯ Z0 +
³
¯ Z0 −




¡ ¯ Z − ¯ Z2/8
¢
. To establish single crossing in (θ,Z), let us take θ(1) = 0 and θ(5) = 1 and
also suppose that A(1) ≥ A(0). In that case, single crossing in (θ,Z) requires that whenever
¯ Z0, ¯ Z ∈ Z =[ 0 ,6] and ¯ Z0 > ¯ Z,a n d
¯ Z +
¡ ¯ Z − ¯ Z2/8
¢
+ A(1) + B
¡¯ L
¢
> ¯ Z + A(0) + B
¡¯ L
¢




¡ ¯ Z0¢2 /8
´
+ A(1) + B
¡¯ L
¢




It is straightforward to verify that the ﬁrst inequality will hold for all ¯ Z ∈ (0,6] since, in this
case,
¡ ¯ Z − ¯ Z2/8
¢




¡ ¯ Z0¢2 /8
´
> 0 ≥ A(0) − A(1), establishing single crossing in (θ,Z).S i n c eb y
Lemma 3 in Appendix B, when Z and Θ are chains, single crossing in (Z,θ) and (θ,Z) implies
quasi-supermodularity in (Z,θ), this result also implies that increasing diﬀerences in (Z,θ)
cannot be replaced with quasi-supermodularity in (Z,θ).
Finally, this example also shows that the assumption that the function needs to exhibit
increasing diﬀerences in (Z,θ) on the convex hull of Z, ¯ Z, cannot be dispensed with. In
particular, if we take Z = {1,5} and Θ = {θ(1),θ(5)},i tc a nb ev e r i ﬁed that the function
F here satisﬁes supermodularity on Z×Θ, and hence exhibits increasing diﬀerences in (Z,θ)
on Z×Θ (see Lemma 2 in Appendix B). However, it fails to satisfy supermodularity and
increasing diﬀerences on ¯ Z×Θ,w h e r e ¯ Z =[1,5].30
30To see why it is necessary for F to be supermodular or exhibit increasing diﬀerences in (Z,θ) over the


























Now, assuming diﬀerentiability and applying the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus (e.g., Rudin, 1964, Theorem








35There is a natural and important generalization of Theorem 4 in which the supplies of a
set of factors change simultaneously, and the induced change in technology is biased towards
all of these factors. This is presented in the next theorem. Let the production function be




for j =1 ,...,N.
The notion of equilibrium bias generalizes naturally.
Deﬁnition 12 Let ¯ Z ∈Z ⊂RN
+, ¯ L ∈L and θ
¡¯ Z, ¯ L
¢
be the equilibrium technology choice in an
economy with factor supplies
¡¯ Z, ¯ L
¢
. We say that there is global absolute equilibrium bias if
for any ¯ Z0, ¯ Z ∈ Z, ¯ Z0 ≥ ¯ Z implies
wZj
³
˜ Z, ¯ L,θ




˜ Z, ¯ L,θ




˜ Z, ¯ L
´
∈ Z×Land for all j =1 ,...,N.
Once again, this deﬁnition can be strengthened by introducing strict inequalities.
Theorem 5 (Generalized Global Equilibrium Bias) Consider Economy D, C or M. Sup-
pose that Z and Θ are lattices, let ¯ Z be the convex hull of Z,l e tθ
¡¯ Z, ¯ L
¢
be the equilibrium
technology at factor proportions
¡¯ Z, ¯ L
¢
, and suppose that F (Z,L,θ) is continuously diﬀeren-
tiable in Z, supermodular in θ on Θ for all Z ∈ ¯ Z and L ∈L, and exhibits strictly increasing
diﬀerences in (Z,θ) on ¯ Z×Θ for all L ∈L, then there is global absolute equilibrium bias, i.e.,
for any ¯ Z0, ¯ Z ∈ Z, ¯ Z0 ≥ ¯ Z implies
θ
¡¯ Z0, ¯ L
¢
≥ θ
¡¯ Z, ¯ L
¢




˜ Z, ¯ L,θ




˜ Z, ¯ L,θ




˜ Z, ¯ L
´
∈ Z×Land for all j =1 ,...,N.
Proof. The proof is analogous to that of Theorem 4 and follows from Theorem 10 in
Appendix B given the supermodularity of F (Z,L,θ) in θ and strict increasing diﬀerences in
(Z,θ) on ¯ Z× Θ.
It is clear that corollaries to this theorem similar to those to Theorem 4 can be stated
with slightly stronger conditions. I omit these to avoid repetition. Also, as in Theorem 4,






for all Z ∈ [Z
0,Z
00] unless F is supermodular over the convex hull of {Z
0,Z
00}.
36supermodularity in θ can be weakened to quasi-supermodularity in θ, or strict increasing
diﬀerences can be relaxed to increasing diﬀerences and the comparison of θ
¡¯ Z0, ¯ L
¢
to θ
¡¯ Z, ¯ L
¢
would apply for the greatest and the least elements of the equilibrium technology set.
5 Strong Absolute Equilibrium Bias
The results in Section 4 concern “weak” bias in the sense that they compare marginal products
at a given level of factor supplies (in response to a change in θ induced by a change in Z).
This section provides the conditions under which equilibrium bias will be “strong” in the sense
that once technology has adjusted, the increase in the supply of factor Z will increase its
marginal product (price). As noted in the Introduction, this is particularly important because
it emphasizes the central role of the equilibrium structure in the analysis here, since such a
result would not be possible in the neoclassical production theory.
Example 1 above illustrated the possibility of strong relative bias where technology might be
so responsive to factor supply changes that when a factor becomes more abundant, its relative
price and marginal product increase rather than decrease. Although somewhat counterintuitive
at ﬁrst, this is also a possibility in the class of models studied here. But we will see that it
requires some type of nonconvexity either in the technology set, Θ, or in the production
possibilities set by allowing for a structure similar to that of Economy C or Economy M. First,
Id e ﬁne strong absolute bias, and to simplify the discussion, from now on, I focus on changes
in a single factor. Recall throughout that equilibrium technology is still a solution to the
maximization problem in (34).
Deﬁnition 13 Suppose that N =1 .L e tθ(Z,L) ∈ Θ be the equilibrium technology choice in
an economy with factor proportions (Z,L). We say that there is strong absolute equilibrium
bias at
¡© ¯ Z, ¯ Z0ª
, ¯ L
¢
if for some ¯ L ∈L and ¯ Z, ¯ Z0 ∈ Z with ¯ Z0 > ¯ Z,w eh a v e
wZ
¡ ¯ Z0, ¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z0, ¯ L
¢¢
>w Z
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢¢
.
Similarly, suppose that Θ ⊂ RK, wZ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢¢
is diﬀerentiable in Z and ∂θj




¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
for all j =1 ,...,K. Then we say that there is strong absolute equilibrium bias
at




¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ





¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ







¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ








37Note that in this deﬁnition I use dwZ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢¢
/dZ to denote the total derivative,
while ∂wZ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢¢
/∂Z denotes the partial derivative holding θ = θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
. The next
theorem shows that there cannot be strong absolute bias in Economy D if Θ is a convex subset
of RK.
Theorem 6 (No Strong Bias in Economy D) Suppose that Θ is a convex subset of RK,
F is twice continuously diﬀerentiable in (Z,θ), let the equilibrium technology at factor supplies
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
be θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
, and assume that ∂θj
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
/∂Z exists at
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
for all j =1 ,...,K. Then
there cannot be strong absolute bias in Economy D.
Proof. Let us start with the local result and the case with θ ∈ R. Let factor supplies be
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
. Strong absolute bias corresponds to
dwZ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ





¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ





¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ








This is equivalent to
dwZ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ





¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ




¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ








Recall from the proof of Theorem 3 that when θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
is in the interior of Θ,t h eﬁrst-order
condition (38) holds, and we have:
∂θ





¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ




¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ




¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ




¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢¢
/∂θ2.
so strong absolute bias would imply
dwZ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ





¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ





¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ





¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢¢
/∂θ2 > 0. (42)
To see that this is impossible, ﬁr s tn o t et h a ts i n c e∂θ
¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L
¢
/∂Z exists, ∂2F
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢¢
/∂θ2 <
0 (from the non-singularity, ∂2F
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
¢
/∂θ2
j 6=0combined with the fact that θ
¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L
¢
is a
solution to (34), so that ∂2F
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢¢
/∂θ2 ≤ 0); and second that the joint concavity
of F
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢¢
in (Z,θ) implies that the Hessian of F in (Z,θ), ∇2
(Z,θ)(Z,θ)F, is negative
semi-deﬁnite, thus every principle minor of ∇2
(Z,θ)(Z,θ)F of even order has to be nonnegative
(see, e.g., Simon and Blume, 1994, Theorem 16.2). This implies
∂2F
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ





¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ






¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ




which combined with ∂2F
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢¢
/∂θ2 < 0 contradicts (42), proving the claim for
the case of θ ∈ R and in the interior of Θ.W h e n θ is at the boundary of Θ,e i t h e r( 3 8 )
38holds, in which case the same argument applies (since by hypothesis ∂θ
¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L
¢
/∂Z exists
even at this point). Alternatively, ∂F
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢¢
/∂θ < 0. However, in this case since
F is twice continuously diﬀerentiable in (Z,θ) and ∂θ
¡ ¯ Z, ¯ L
¢
/∂Z exists, a suﬃciently small
change in Z will leave ∂F
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢¢
/∂θ < 0 and thus ∂θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
/∂Z =0 .C o n s e q u e n t l y ,
dwZ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢¢
/dZ = ∂wZ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢¢
/∂Z ≤ 0.
Next, to prove this result with multiple dimensions of technology, i.e., with θ ∈ RK for
K>1, note that when θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
is in the interior of Θ,w eh a v e
dwZ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ





¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ







¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ




¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ




¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ




¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
i sas o l u t i o nt o( 3 4 ) ,∇2
θθF
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢¢
is negative semi-deﬁnite and symmet-
r i c( s i n c ei ti saH e s s i a n ) .M o r e o v e r ,s i n c e∇Zθ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
exists by hypothesis, ∇2
θθF
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢¢




¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢¢¤−1
is also negative deﬁnite and symmetric, and moreover ∂2F
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
¢
/∂Z2 ≤ 0 by the concavity
of F in Z (from Assumption 1, 1’, 2 or 2’).







where C is an (n − 1)×(n − 1) s y m m e t r i cn e g a t i v ed e ﬁnite, b is a scalar, and v is an (n − 1)×1
column vector, is negative semi-deﬁnite if and only if b−v0C−1v ≤ 0 where C−1 is the inverse of
C. Let us now apply this lemma with b = ∂2F
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
¢




¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ







¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢¢¤
, which implies that the expression in (43) is equal to b −
v0C−1v. The fact that F is jointly concave in (Z,θ) implies that the Hessian of F with respect
to (Z,θ), ∇2
(Z,θ)(Z,θ)F is negative semi-deﬁnite. Therefore, from Lemma 4, b−v0C−1v ≤ 0 and
(43) cannot be positive, completing the proof of the local result. The proof for the case where
θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
is at the boundary of Θ is analogous to the one above for Θ ⊂ R.
Finally, to prove the global result, i.e., that strong bias is impossible in this economy for
any change in factor supplies, note that from the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus, for any
¯ Z0 > ¯ Z,w eh a v e
wZ
¡ ¯ Z0, ¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z0, ¯ L
¢¢
− wZ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
















¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢¢
/dZ ≤ 0 for all Z ∈
£ ¯ Z, ¯ Z0¤
,t h ei n t e g r a li sn o n p o s i t i v e ,e s t a b l i s h i n g
the global result.
39The result in this theorem is not surprising. In Economy D, the production possibilities
set is convex, so the marginal product of each factor is decreasing in its supply even after
technology adjusts. In contrast, once we allow for nonconvexities (and factor demands and
technology to be chosen by diﬀerent agents), the results are very diﬀerent. To illustrate the
importance of nonconvexities, I now look at Economy D with a nonconvex technology set Θ,31
and at Economies C or M, which allow for natural nonconvexities. I establish that in both
c a s e ss t r o n ga b s o l u t eb i a si sp o s s i b l e .
Theorem 7 (Strong Absolute Bias) Strong absolute equilibrium bias is possible either in
Economy D with a nonconvex technology set, Θ, or in Economy C or M.
This theorem will be proved by providing two examples with strong absolute equilibrium
bias.
Example 5 (Strong Absolute Bias in Economy D) Take Economy D and suppose that
F (Z,L,θ)=Z1/2θ1/2 − θ + B (L) and Θ = {1,4}. Imagine an increase in ¯ Z from 4 to 9+ε
































,s ot h a tθ(9 + ε)=4(in particular, the two sides are
equal when ε =0 , and the left-hand side increases faster in ε). Therefore, an increase in
¯ Z from 4 to 9+ε will induce a change in technology from θ(4) = 1 to θ(9 + ε)=4 .T h e
price (marginal product) of factor Z is given by wZ





¢1/2 /2,s ot h ec h a n g ei n
this price resulting from the increase in ¯ Z (after technology adjusts) is wZ




¡ ¯ Z =4 , ¯ L,1
¢
=( 4 /(9 + ε))
1/2 /2 − (1/4)
1/2 /2 ' 1/3 − 1/4 > 0 for ε suﬃciently small,
establishing the possibility of strong absolute bias in Economy D with a nonconvex technology
set.
Example 6 (Strong Absolute Bias in Economy C or M) Next, consider Economy C or
M, and to illustrate that a nonconvex technology set is not necessary in these economies, take
Θ = R. Suppose F (Z,L,θ)=4 Z1/2 +Zθ−θ2/2+B (L) (again with the cost of creating new
technologies, C (θ), incorporated into this function). Clearly F is not jointly concave in Z and
θ (for Z>1) but is strictly concave in Z and θ individually. As Theorem 8 below will show,
this is a crucial feature in generating strong (absolute) bias. Now consider a change from ¯ Z =1
31In Economy D, when Assumption 1 applies the technology set Θ is also assumed to be convex. This
assumption can be relaxed. Recall also that convexity of Θ is not required by Assumption 1’, which only
requires L and Z to be convex.
40to ¯ Z =4 . Clearly, the ﬁrst-order necessary and suﬃcient condition for technology choice gives
θ





= ¯ Z. Therefore, θ
¡ ¯ Z =1
¢
=1while θ
¡ ¯ Z =4
¢
=4 . Moreover, for any ¯ L ∈ L,
wZ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
¢
=2 Z−1/2 + θ.T h e r e f o r e , wZ
¡ ¯ Z =1 , ¯ L,θ(1)
¢
=3<w Z
¡ ¯ Z =4 , ¯ L,θ(4)
¢
=5 ,
establishing strong (absolute) equilibrium bias between ¯ Z =1to ¯ Z =4 . In fact, Theorem
8 implies that there will be local strong equilibrium bias in this example for all ¯ Z ≥ 1,a n d
Theorem 9 then implies that there will be global strong equilibrium bias between any ¯ Z0 and
¯ Z with ¯ Z0 > ¯ Z ≥ 1.
The importance of Theorem 7 is that, contrary to the predictions of the standard production
theory, where the increase in the supply of a factor always reduces its price (and marginal
product), with endogenous technology choice or technological change, the price of a factor which
has become more abundant can increase. Examples 5 and 6 show that it is straightforward to
construct economies in which there is such strong bias.
This theorem also distinguishes the approach in this paper from the literature on the
LeChatelier principle, which looks at the decision problem of a single ﬁr m .A si sw e l l - k n o w n ,t h e
ﬁrm’s demand curve for a factor is always downward sloping in its own price (e.g., Mas-Colell,
Whinston and Green, 1995, Proposition 5.C.2), so the equilibrium structure (in particular, the
equilibrium with aggregate nonconvexities) is important for the results in this paper, especially
for the possibility of strong equilibrium bias.
The fact that strong equilibrium bias is possible in Economy D when the technology set
Θ is nonconvex is also interesting. Although many existing approaches to technology, such as
the models of endogenous technological progress (e.g., Romer, 1990, Grossman and Helpman,
1991, Aghion and Howitt, 1992), view technology as a scalar in a convex set, as already
discussed in the Introduction, for many important technological choices, switching between
discrete technologies may be quite important. If this is the case, allowing Θ to be nonconvex
is important and realistic (recall that Theorems 4 and 5 above do not require Θ to be convex).
Finally, as stated in the Introduction and already hinted in the discussion, “greater non-
convexity” makes it more likely that the economy will feature strong absolute bias. This is for-
malized in the next theorem. Recall that in Economy C or M, F (Z,L,θ)=G(Z,L,θ)−C (θ),
so marginal product of Z is equivalently given by the derivative of function F or G.R e c a l l
also that F (Z,L,θ) is always concave in (Z,L) (from Assumption 1, 1’, 2 or 2’) and has to
be locally concave in θ for θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
to be an equilibrium technology (i.e., a solution to the
maximization problem in (34)). Recall that if F is jointly concave in (Z,θ) at
¡
Z,θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢¢
,
its Hessian with respect to (Z,θ), ∇2F(Z,θ)(Z,θ), is negative semi-deﬁnite at this point (though
41negative semi-deﬁniteness is not suﬃcient for local joint concavity).
Theorem 8 (Nonconvexity and Strong Bias) Consider Economy C or M. Suppose that
Θ is a convex subset of RK, F is twice continuously diﬀerentiable in (Z,θ),l e tθ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
be the
equilibrium technology at factor supplies
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
and assume that θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
is in the interior of
Θ and that ∂θj
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
/∂Z exists at
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
for all j =1 ,...,K. Then there is strong absolute
bias at
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
if and only if F (Z,L,θ)’s Hessian in (Z,θ), ∇2F(Z,θ)(Z,θ), is not negative semi-
deﬁnite at
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢¢
.
Proof. Let us start with the case where Θ ⊂ R.S i n c e ,b yh y p o t h e s i s ,θ is in the interior
of Θ,t h eﬁrst-order condition, equation (38) from the proof of Theorem 3, holds. Then recall
the proof of Theorem 6 and in particular, equation (42), where it was established that for the
case of θ ∈ R:
dwZ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ





¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ





¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ





¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢¢
/∂θ2 .
Again from Assumption 1, 1’, 2 or 2’, F is concave in Z,s o∂2F
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
¢
/∂Z2 ≤ 0,a n d
from the fact that θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
is a solution to (34) and ∂θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
/∂Z exists, we also have
∂2F
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢¢
/∂θ2 < 0. Then the fact that F
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢¢
’s Hessian, ∇2F(Z,θ)(Z,θ),
is not negative semi-deﬁnite at
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ





¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ






¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ






¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ




Since at the optimal technology choice, ∂2F
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢¢
/∂θ2 < 0, this immediately yields
dwZ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ




establishing strong absolute bias at
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢¢
as claimed in the theorem.
Conversely, if ∇2F(Z,θ)(Z,θ) is negative semi-deﬁnite at
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢¢
,t h e n
¡
∂2F
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ






¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ






¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ




which, together with ∂2F
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢¢
/∂θ2 < 0, implies that dwZ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢¢
/dZ ≤ 0,
establishing that for strong bias at
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢¢
we need ∇2F(Z,θ)(Z,θ) not to be negative
semi-deﬁnite at
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢¢
.
Now for the general case where Θ ⊂ RK and θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
is in the interior of Θ,t h eo v e r a l l
change in the price of factor Z is given by (43) in the proof of Theorem 6, i.e.,
dwZ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ





¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ







¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ




¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ




¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢¢¤
.
42Again by the same arguments, ∂2F
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
¢
/∂Z2 ≤ 0 and ∇2
θθF
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢¢
is negative




¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢¢¤−1 is also neg-
ative deﬁnite and symmetric). Suppose that ∇2F(Z,θ)(Z,θ) is not negative semi-deﬁnite at
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢¢
. Then from Lemma 4 in Appendix B and using the same notation as in the
p r oo fo fT h e o r e m6 ,l e tB = ∇2F(Z,θ)(Z,θ), b = ∂2F






¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ







¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢¢¤
, so that (44) is equal to b−v0C−1v evaluated at
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢¢
.
Lemma 4 immediately implies that if ∇2F(Z,θ)(Z,θ) i sn o tn e g a t i v es e m i - d e ﬁnite at
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢¢
,
then b − v0C−1v>0,s ot h a tdwZ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢¢
/dZ > 0 and there is strong bias at
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢¢
.
Conversely, again from Lemma 4, if ∇2F(Z,θ)(Z,θ) is negative semi-deﬁnite at
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢¢
,
then b − v0C−1v ≤ 0 and dwZ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢¢
/dZ ≤ 0, so that there is no strong bias at
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢¢
, completing the proof.
This theorem therefore shows that in Economy C or M strong absolute bias will obtain
if and only if the Hessian of the function F (Z,L,θ) f a i l st ob en e g a t i v es e m i - d e ﬁnite, which
loosely corresponds to F failing to be jointly concave in (Z,θ). It therefore highlights the
importance of nonconvexities in generating strong equilibrium bias of technology.32
More speciﬁcally, recall that for Economies C and M, we have Z and θ chosen by diﬀerent
agents. For example, in Economy M, ﬁnal good producers choose their input demands, while
the technology monopolist chooses technology. This implies that we are at the maximum of F
when we change only Z or only θ. But this does not guarantee that we are at the maximum
in the entire (Z,θ) plane. In other words, the equilibrium may be a saddle point rather than
a maximum of the function F. When this is the case, a change in Z will induce θ to change in
the direction of further increasing F, and consequently, the marginal product of factor Z will
increase. Contrasting this result with Theorem 6, we see the importance of the equilibrium
structure and nonconvexity. As shown in Theorem 6, in Economy D with a convex technology
set Θ, equilibrium ensures that we are at a maximum, so strong equilibrium bias is not possible.
Strong equilibrium bias is only possible when equilibrium results from the interaction of choices
by diﬀerent agents (e.g., ﬁnal good producers and the technology monopolist), or when the
technology set Θ is itself nonconvex.
Note also that Theorem 8 not only speciﬁes the conditions for strong equilibrium bias,
but also highlights that these are not very restrictive. In fact, inspection of Example 6 shows
32The assumption that θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
is in the interior of Θ i sa d o p t e dt oo b t a i na n“ i fa n do n l yi f ”t h e o r e m .W h e n
θ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L
¢
is at the boundary of Θ, strong equilibrium bias is again possible, but failure of negative semi-deﬁniteness
is no longer suﬃcient.
43that it is very straightforward to construct cases in which equilibria in Economies C and M
correspond to saddle points, and thus satisfy the conditions of Theorem 8.
Finally, it is also possible to provide a generalization of Theorem 8 for large changes in
supplies (corresponding to strong bias between factor supplies
© ¯ Z, ¯ Z0ª
as in the ﬁr s tp a r to f
Deﬁnition 13). In particular, we have:33
Theorem 9 (Nonconvexity and Global Strong Bias) Consider Economy C or M. Sup-
pose that Θ is a convex subset of RK, F is twice continuously diﬀerentiable in (Z,θ),l e t¯ Z, ¯ Z0 ∈





















all j =1 ,...,K for all ˜ Z ∈
£ ¯ Z, ¯ Z0¤
. Then there is strong absolute bias at












£ ¯ Z, ¯ Z0¤
.
Proof. The proof follows from the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus and the proof of
Theorem 8. Take ¯ Z and ¯ Z0 > ¯ Z in Z and ﬁx ¯ L ∈L. Then
wZ
¡ ¯ Z0, ¯ L,θ
¡ ¯ Z0, ¯ L
¢¢
− wZ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ




















/dZ > 0 for all Z ∈
£ ¯ Z, ¯ Z0¤
, so (45) is positive, establishing the result.
The conditions of Theorem 9 are more demanding than Theorem 8, since they require that
the Hessian of F with respect to (Z,θ) should fail to be negative semi-deﬁnite at all points
˜ Z ∈
£ ¯ Z, ¯ Z0¤
. Moreover, this theorem is weaker than Theorem 8, since it states that failure of
negative semi-deﬁniteness of the Hessian of F between ¯ Z and ¯ Z0 is suﬃcient to ensure strong
absolute bias between ¯ Z and ¯ Z0, but does not state that it is necessary (and it is straightforward
to check that it is not). This motivated my focus on Theorem 8 for most of the discussion.
33At this point, we can also return to a further discussion of why the local weak bias result did not translate
into a global weak bias result (without imposing further conditions), whereas the strong bias result does (recall
the discussion in Example 3). In particular, one might have conjectured that an argument using the Fundamental
Theorem of Calculus similar to that in the proof of Theorem 9, in particular, equation (45), may work for weak
bias as well. To illustrate why this is not the case, let us suppose that Θ ⊂ R.T h e n :
dwZ
¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ
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¡ ¯ Z,¯ L,θ






Equation (45) and Theorem 9 apply to this entire term, while weak bias concerns the second part of this term.
It is not possible to apply the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus just to this term, and intuitively, this is the
notion discussed in Example 3, whereby an induced change in θ at some ¯ Z that is biased towards Z may be
biased against Z at some diﬀerent factor supply, ¯ Z
0.
446C o n c l u s i o n
An investigation of the determinants of equilibrium (endogenous) bias is important both for a
better understanding of nature of technology adoption and technological change, and to study
the distributional implications of new technologies.
In this paper, I analyzed the implications of changes in factor supplies on relative and
absolute bias of technology. First, I generalized a number of existing results in the literature
about relative bias in two-factor economies. These results are about how the relative marginal
product of a factor responds to technological progress or technology adoption induced by
changes in factor supplies. In particular, I established that when the economy has access
to two technologies, one augmenting factor Z and the other L, equilibrium technology will
always be relatively biased towards the factor that has become more abundant. Moreover, this
induced-bias can be strong enough to increase the relative price of the factor that becomes
more abundant. These results are interesting both because they apply to many macro models
of economic growth, and also because they are essentially the opposite of the presumption in
the literature following Hicks’ (1932) seminal work. Nevertheless, the analysis also showed
that these results about relative bias do not generalize once we depart from a world with
only factor-augmenting technologies. The reason is that induced changes in technology may
increase the marginal product of the other factor more than the marginal product of the factor
becoming more abundant. This suggests that more general theorems may apply to absolute
rather than relative bias.
The second part of the paper shows that this is indeed the case and provides general
theorems about absolute bias, i.e., how the marginal product of a factor (rather than its relative
marginal product) changes in response to technology. I proved that under mild assumptions,
changes in technology induced by small changes in factor supplies are always (absolutely) biased
towards the factor that has become more abundant. I also showed that under supermodularity-
type assumptions, the same result can be generalized to any magnitude of change in factor
supplies, and can be applied to simultaneous changes in the supplies of a set of factors.
Finally, the last section contains the most important results of the paper. It illustrated the
possibility of strong (absolute) equilibrium bias. In particular, with strong equilibrium bias,
an increase in the supply of a factor induces a suﬃciently large change in technology so that
the marginal product (price) of the factor that has become more abundant increases; in other
words, demand curves for factors become upward sloping. The analysis demonstrated that
such strong equilibrium bias is impossible without nonconvexities, but is easy to obtain once
45nonconvexities are present. Moreover, Theorem 8 provided precise conditions for such strong
bias to exist, related to the failure of joint concavity of the F function in factor demands and
technology, which is possible (and in fact quite typical) in equilibrium environments.
To keep the exposition simple, I have made diﬀerentiability assumptions throughout the
paper, but the global results can be easily generalized by relaxing diﬀerentiability since they
were derived using tools from the theory of monotone comparative statics. Another possible
generalization is to introduce multiple goods rather than a single ﬁnal good. This complicates
the analysis, but the general insights do not appear to depend on the single good assumption.
Yet another interesting generalization might be to integrate some of these results into growth
models where there can be long-run growth due to technological change (see Acemoglu, 1998,
2002, 2003b or Jones, 2005, for various growth models with relative equilibrium bias). More
important directions for future research include an investigation of the bias of technology in
alternative settings where the problem of determining equilibrium technology is not equiva-
lent to a maximization problem. The most important example of this is a strategic setting
where there is (oligopolistic) competition between various ﬁrms that are also choosing their
technologies. Finally, the most important area for future research is an empirical investigation
of whether the implications of these strong theorems actually hold in the data.
467 Appendix A: Technology Choice with Monopoly in Economy
C
In this appendix, I brieﬂy discuss the results in the environment of Economy C if the research
is undertaken by a proﬁt-maximizing monopolist. The main result is that if we allow the
monopolist to charge price schedules rather than a linear price, the result is once again an
equilibrium that corresponds to the maximization of some function F(¯ Z, ¯ L,θ).
Recall that the production function is given by (6), with the same assumptions on the
function G. Suppose that without buying the rights to use some technology, each ﬁrm would
produce zero output. They can buy these rights from the monopolist technology producer,
at some price χ (I will specify what this price is a function of below). The major diﬀerence
is that the technology monopolist will choose the technology θ to maximize its proﬁts rather
than social surplus or total output. Since without the technology, a ﬁrm produces zero output,





t(i)π(Zi,Li,θi)di − C (θ),
where t(i) is an indicator for whether ﬁrm i is buying the new technology. Under the same
assumption as in Economy C that the monopolist can only choose one technology from the
menu, it will simply maximize Π(θ). The problem here is that as the monopolist provides
better technologies to all ﬁrms, they compete more ﬁercely for the factors of production, so
factor prices increase, and as a result, the proﬁts that the technology monopolist can extract
decline. For example, if G exhibits constant returns to scale in (Z,L), the monopolist can never
extract any positive proﬁts by charging any price schedule χ(θ) and selling its new technology
to all ﬁrms. In fact, in this case, it would clearly be beneﬁcial for the monopolist to charge a
price that is not only a function of the technology, but also of the employment levels of the
ﬁrms, so as to manipulate their factor demand. In particular, suppose that the monopolist

























¡¯ Z, ¯ L
¢
for some ξ>0, and the strategy of selling to a total of 1 − ε ﬁrms, where ε>0. The price
schedule makes it proﬁtable for all ﬁrms that are oﬀered the technology to take it, since they
will make additional proﬁts equal to ξ by doing so. Since ε>0, there will be excess labor
47supply, so all factor prices will be equal to 0. Consequently,
sup
ξ,ε,θ
Π(θ)=G(¯ Z, ¯ L,θ) − C (θ).
This is written as “sup” not as “max”, since the supremum is never reached and the monopolist
approaches it as ξ ↓ 0 and ε ↓ 0. The important result for the analysis is that technology choice
is again the solution to the maximization of some function F(¯ Z, ¯ L,θ) (though the supremum
is never reached). Even though in this case factor prices are equal to zero, all the results in
the text apply to the marginal products of the factors (which are never zero).
488 Appendix B: Some Technical Deﬁnitions and Results
In this section, I deﬁne some of the terms used in the analysis of global equilibrium bias.
The reader is referred to the much more detail discussion in Topkis (1978, 1998), and also to
Milgrom and Roberts (1990) and Milgrom and Shannon (1994). At the end of the section, I
also prove a lemma on negative semi-deﬁnite matrices, which is used in the proofs of Theorems
6a n d8 .
Let X be a partially ordered set, with an order (reﬂexive, anti-symmetric and transitive
binary relation) denoted by ≥ (or >). For example, X = R2 with the order such that (x0
1,x 0
2) ≥
(>)(x1,x 2) only if x0
1 ≥ (>)x1 and x0
2 ≥ (>)x2 is a partially ordered set. In contrast, X = R
with the natural order ≥ (>) is an ordered set or a chain. Let x0 ∨ x denote the join,o rt h e
least upper bound of two elements of a partially ordered set X. For example, when X = R2,
(x0
1,x 0
2) ∨ (x1,x 2)=( m a x {x1,x 0
1},max{x2,x 0
2}). Similarly, the meet,o rt h eg r e a t e s tl o w e r
bound of two elements of a partially ordered set is denoted by x0 ∧ x, and for the case where
X = R2, (x0
1,x 0
2) ∧ (x1,x 2)=( m i n{x1,x 0
1},min{x2,x 0
2}). X or a subset S of X is a lattice if
it contains the join and the meet of each pair of its elements. A subset X0 of X is a sublattice
of X (i.e., a lattice according to the same order over X)i fX0 contains the joint and the meet
of each pair of its own elements.
Let f : X → R be a real-valued function and X be a lattice. Then we have a more general
deﬁnition of supermodularity than the one in the text:














for all x0,x00 ∈ X.M o r e o v e r , f (x) is strictly supermodular if it satisﬁes (46) with strict
inequality for all unordered x0,x00 ∈ X.
When f (x) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable over X, the deﬁnition for supermodularity
is equivalent to the one in the text.
Another useful deﬁnition is that of increasing diﬀerences, which weakens the supermodu-
larity requirements.34
Deﬁnition 15 Let X and T be partially ordered sets. Then a function f (x,t) deﬁned on
a subset S of X × T has increasing diﬀerences in (x,t), if for all t00 >t , f (x,t00) − f (x,t)
34The notion of “increasing diﬀerences” was originally called isotone in Topkis (1968, 1978), and is sometimes
referred to as non-decreasing diﬀerences (e.g., Amir, 1996).
49is nondecreasing in x.M o r e o v e r ,f (x,t) has strictly increasing diﬀerences in (x,t), if for all
t00 >t , f (x,t00) − f (x,t) is strictly increasing in x.
Clearly, (strictly) increasing diﬀerences in in (x,t) and in (t,x) are identical.
In the text, I also made use of the concepts of single crossing property and quasi-supermodularity.
These are deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 16 A real-valued function f (x) deﬁned on a (sub)lattice X is quasi-supermodular



























Deﬁnition 17 Let f (x,t) be a real-valued function deﬁned on X × T where X and T are
partially ordered sets. Then f (x,t) satisﬁes the single crossing property in (x,t) if x00 >x 0,
t00 >t 0 and f (x00,t 0) ≥ f (x0,t 0) implies that f (x00,t 00) ≥ f (x0,t 00) and f (x00,t 0) >f(x0,t 0)
implies that f (x00,t 00) >f(x0,t 00).
We have the following result linking supermodularity to increasing diﬀerences.
Lemma 2 Suppose that X is a lattice. If f (x) is (strictly) supermodular on X,t h e nf (x)
exhibits (strictly) increasing diﬀerences on X. Moreover, suppose in addition that X ⊂ RK.
Then if f (x) exhibits (strictly) increasing diﬀerences on X, f (x) is (strictly) supermodular on
X.
Proof. The ﬁrst part follows from Theorem 2.6.1 of Topkis (1998), while the second part
is an implication of Corollary 2.6.1 of Topkis (1998).
Next, it is useful to state some of the relationships between these concepts invoked in
Example 3, and some additional results linking increasing diﬀerences to the single crossing
property:
Lemma 3 Let f be a real valued function. Then:
1. If X is a lattice and f (x) is supermodular on X,t h e nf (x) is quasi-supermodular on X.
2. If X1 and X2 are lattices and X is a sublattice of X1×X2 and f (x) is quasi-supermodular
on X,t h e nf (x) has the single crossing property in (x1,x 2) and (x2,x 1) on X.
503. If X1 and X2 are chains and X is a sublattice of X1×X2 and f (x) has the single crossing
property in (x1,x 2) and (x2,x 1) on X,t h e nf (x) is quasi-supermodular on X.
4. If X1 and X2 are partially ordered sets, X is a subset of X1 ×X2 and f (x1,x 2) exhibits
increasing diﬀerences in (x1,x 2) on X,t h e nf (x1,x 2) has the single crossing property in
(x1,x 2) and (x2,x 1) on X.
Proof. See Lemma 2.6.5 of Topkis (1998).
The key theorem for the analysis is the Monotonicity Theorem of Topkis. Here I state
a version, which combines elements from Topkis’ (1998) Theorems 2.7.1, 2.8.1, 2.8.4, 2.8.6
and Corollary 2.7.1 (see also Topkis, 1978, Theorems 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3). Instead of striving
for ultimate generality, I state a version that applies in the context of the problem in the
text (e.g., instead of upper semi-continuity, which is necessary for the existence of solutions, I
impose continuity etc.).
Theorem 10 (Monotonicity Theorem) Suppose that X and T are lattices and f (x,t) is
quasi-supermodular in x and exhibits increasing diﬀerences in (x,t) on a compact and complete
sublattice S of X × T and continuous in x on S, then A(t) ≡ argmaxx∈S f (x,t) is a non-
empty, compact and complete sublattice of X and is increasing in t.M o r e o v e r , i f f (x,t) is
quasi-supermodular in x and exhibits strictly increasing diﬀerences in (x,t), then for any t0 >t ,
x(t) ∈ A(t) and x(t0) ∈ A(t0), x(t0) ≥ x(t).
Proof. See Topkis (1998).
In the text, I make use of the second part of this theorem which requires f (x,t) to exhibit
strictly increasing diﬀerences in (x,t), which is only a slightly stronger requirement than in-
creasing diﬀerences. With increasing diﬀerences, all the results in the text continue to apply
except that we only know that the set A(t) is increasing (ascending) in t, so all the comparisons
have to be for the greatest or the least element of the set A(t). Strict increasing diﬀerences
ensures that any element of A(t0) is greater than any element of A(t) for t0 >t .
Another useful theorem, ﬁrst derived by Amir (1996) and generalized by Topkis (1998)
Theorem 2.8.5, is the following, which I refer to as the “Strong Monotonicity Theorem”. Here
again I state a slightly simpliﬁed version of the theorem:
Theorem 11 (Strong Monotonicity Theorem) Suppose that X is a convex sublattice of
Rn and T is a sublattice of Rm,a n df (x,t) is quasi-supermodular in x, twice continuously
diﬀerentiable in (x,t) on a compact and complete sublattice S of X ×T, continuous in x on S,
51and ∂f (x,t)/∂xi is strictly increasing in t for all i =1 ,...,n, then A(t) ≡ argmaxx∈S f (x,t)
is a non-empty, compact and complete sublattice of X.M o r e o v e r ,i ft0,t∈ T with t0 >t , and
x(t) ∈ A(t) and x(t0) ∈ A(t0) are in the interior of X,t h e nx(t0) >x(t).
Proof. See Topkis (1998) Theorem 2.8.5.
The important feature of this strong monotonicity theorem is that under some additional as-
sumptions, it establishes a strict ordering between x(t0) and x(t), while the original monotonic-
ity theorem only has a weak ordering.35
Finally, we have the following lemma, which is used in the proofs of Theorems 6 and 8.36
Recall that for a matrix (vector) v, v0 denotes its transpose.







where C is a (n − 1) × (n − 1) s y m m e t r i cn e g a t i v ed e ﬁnite matrix, b is a scalar, and v is
a (n − 1) × 1 column vector. Then we have that B is negative semi-deﬁnite if and only if
b − v0C−1v ≤ 0.
Proof. (⇐=) B is negative semi-deﬁnite if and only if
(x;y)0B(x;y) ≤ 0,
where x is an arbitrary (n − 1) × 1 vector and y is a scalar, (x;y) is the n × 1 column vector
constructed by stacking x and y.U s i n gt h ef o r mo fB in (48), we have
(x;y)0B(x;y)=x0Cx+2 yx0v + by2. (49)
When y =0 , the above expression is always nonpositive since C is negative deﬁnite, so B is
negative semi-deﬁnite as claimed.
Next consider the case where y 6=0 .I nt h i sc a s e ,l e tz be the (n − 1)×1 vector constructed
as z = x/y, and let us further expand (49):
(x;y)0B(x;y)=y2(z0Cz+2 z0v + b)
= y2(z0Cz+2 z0v + v0C−1v)+y2(b − v0C−1v). (50)
35The assumption that ∂f (x,t)/∂xi is strictly increasing in t for all i =1 ,...,n,i ss l i g h t l yw e a k e rt h a n
∂
2f (x,t)/∂xi∂tj > 0 for all i =1 ,...,n and j =1 ,...,m. Also, the condition that x(t
0) and x(t) are in the
interior of X can be relaxed along the lines of Theorem 2.8.5 of Topkis (1998).
36I thank Alp Simsek for help with the proof of this lemma.
52Since C is a real symmetric negative deﬁnite matrix, −C is a real symmetric and positive
deﬁnite matrix, so there exists a non-singular matrix M such that −C = M0M.M o r e o v e r ,w e
also have that −C−1 = M−1 (M0)
−1 = M−1 ¡
M−1¢0 [since (M0)−1 =( M−1)0]. Now, rewriting
equation (50) in terms of M,w eh a v e




z − 2z0v + v0M−1 ¡
M0¢−1 v)+y2(b − v0C−1v). (51)
(51) implies that B is negative semi-deﬁnite if and only if
κ ≡ y2(z0 ¡
M0M
¢
z − 2z0v + v0M−1 ¡
M0¢−1 v) − y2(b − v0C−1v) ≥ 0.





























− y2(b − v0C−1v).











− y2(b − v0C−1v) ≥ 0. (52)
Now suppose
b − v0C−1v ≤ 0,










and is always non-negative for any z,s oκ ≥ 0, establishing that B is negative semi-deﬁnite.
(=⇒) Conversely, suppose that B is negative semi-deﬁnite, which implies that (x;y)0B(x;y) ≤
0 for all (x;y). To obtain a contradiction, suppose that
b − v0C−1v>0.
Then, take y 6=0 , and in terms of equation (52), set z = M−1(M0)−1v, which yields κ =
−y2(b − v0C−1v) < 0 in equation (52), contradicting the hypothesis that B is negative semi-
deﬁnite (or that (x;y)0B(x;y) ≤ 0 for all (x;y)), thus yielding a contradiction.
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